J v C

Where a child does not know the identity of his biological father, the court may need to consider whether intervention is required, even if the original contact application is no longer pursued. The child’s advantage in learning the truth must be balanced against the likely impact on the child’s welfare, including the effect on the family on whom the child depends. Timing is material. The risk of later discovery and the possible emotional consequences of learning the truth during or after puberty may favour earlier disclosure, but they do not automatically require immediate disclosure. On the evidence, the likely harm to the mother and family outweighed the immediate advantage to the child of being told.

The father applied for contact with his son, aged 10, after DNA testing confirmed paternity. The application was opposed because of the circumstances of the child’s conception and because the child believed that the mother’s long-term partner was his father. The fact-finding hearing was adjourned and the father later disappeared. His solicitors came off the record, and an order under section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989 required permission before he could restore the application.

The mother accepted that the child should eventually be told the truth but considered disclosure at 16 preferable. The issue was whether the court should act of its own motion to require earlier disclosure, if that was clearly in the child’s best interests.

1. Jurisdiction and intervention. The court had not heard argument on whether it possessed the necessary jurisdiction, but recognised that serious issues concerning a child’s welfare might require the court to act of its own motion, appoint a guardian and hear further argument. This was a significant observation rather than a finally determined jurisdictional ruling.
2. Best interests. Assuming the necessary jurisdiction, the court had to weigh the undoubted benefit to the child of learning the truth about his paternity against the likely impact on the mother and the family on whom the child was dependent. The mother’s vulnerability, health problems, and the evidence of psychiatric and CAFCASS professionals were material.
3. Application. This was not a case in which the mother refused ever to disclose the truth. She intended to do so, but proposed waiting until the child was 16. Although delay created a risk that the child might discover the truth elsewhere, and disclosure after puberty might cause particular upset, those concerns did not outweigh the immediate risks identified in the evidence.
4. The court therefore declined to intervene or direct earlier disclosure. The father’s contact application was dismissed. There was no order for costs, save for detailed assessment of the respondent’s costs.