Lawson v Executor of the Estate of Dawes (Deceased)

A person may be falsely imprisoned where their movements are constrained by apprehension of violence, even without physical restraint. Consent to sexual activity is distinct from submission while intoxicated, drugged, or deprived of the capacity for rational independent decision-making. Previous drug use does not, without more, establish consent to later drug administration or sexual intercourse.

Damages for connected assaults may be assessed globally, including aggravating features, but remain compensatory rather than punitive. A lost opportunity dependent on third-party conduct requires proof of a substantial chance, not proof on the balance of probabilities.

The claimant sued the executor of Christopher Dawes’s estate for multiple rapes, attempted rape, indecent assaults, forced administration of crack cocaine and false imprisonment during a visit to Alderney between 23 and 26 December 1998. She alleged that she had been induced to travel there for a proposed modelling-agency interview, then detained, drugged and sexually assaulted.

The defendant alleged that the claimant had participated willingly and had fabricated the allegations for financial gain. The court had to determine liability, the effect of the claimant’s alleged intoxication and drug use on consent, the existence and causation of psychological injury, and the appropriate assessment of general and special damages.

1. Liability. The claim succeeded on liability. False imprisonment includes constraint by apprehension of violence, as well as physical force. On the evidence, the claimant was held against her will from shortly after arriving in Alderney until she reached the police station. She had not voluntarily abandoned her plans to return home.
2. The claimant was sexually assaulted and raped on several occasions. She did not consent. The court distinguished consent given while affected by drink or drugs from the experience of being assaulted while unable to resist or exercise an independent will. Any previous use of cocaine, cannabis or ecstasy would not establish that she willingly took crack cocaine or consented to intercourse.
3. The claimant’s symptoms were caused by the trauma, although it was less important whether they were given the diagnostic label PTSD than whether the symptoms were genuine and causally related to the events. The evidence supported anxiety, flashbacks, disturbed sleep and social withdrawal. The claimant was not, however, shown to be incapable of work for life. Her future loss was limited to one further year to allow for recovery after the litigation.
4. General damages for the connected torts and aggravating circumstances should be assessed globally: Richardson v Howie [2004] EWCA Civ 1127. The assessment remained compensatory, not punitive, and had to maintain consistency with the existing tariff while reflecting the seriousness and duration of the offending. General damages were assessed at £78,500.
5. The lost opportunity of paid session work was assessed as a lost chance. Where loss depends on hypothetical conduct by third parties, a substantial chance is sufficient; proof that the event was more likely than not is unnecessary: Allied Maples v Simmons & Simmons [1995] 1 WLR 1602. The court awarded £30,000 for that loss. Past income loss was assessed at £136,000 before the identified deductions, together with £25,000 for the lost salon business and £837.50 for miscellaneous losses, with interest to be agreed.