Eastaway v Secretary of State for Trade & Industry

A violation of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time does not ordinarily require pending disqualification proceedings to be stayed or dismissed. The remedy is normally just satisfaction for the delay, unless the delay has made a fair hearing impossible or continuation would otherwise be unfair. A binding undertaking to proceed under an agreed procedure may prevent later reliance on delay, particularly where the relevant issue was not raised when the undertaking was given. General liberty to apply permits enforcement or adjustment of an order, but not a review of the judgment or relief already granted. A statutory power to vary a disqualification undertaking cannot be exercised after the undertaking has expired and does not authorise retrospective rescission.

Mr Eastaway faced disqualification proceedings under the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 arising from the collapse of the Blackspur group. After lengthy procedural history, he gave a Carecraft undertaking and later offered a disqualification undertaking, which was accepted by the Secretary of State and expired in December 2005.

The European Court of Human Rights subsequently found a violation of Article 6(1) because the proceedings had not been determined within a reasonable time and awarded compensation. Mr Eastaway then sought to lift the stay, dismiss the disqualification proceedings, set aside the undertaking, or obtain declaratory relief. The central issues were whether the Strasbourg judgment, alleged error in earlier domestic proceedings, general liberty to apply, statutory variation powers, or the court’s supervisory jurisdiction entitled him to that relief.

1. Relief refused. Mr Eastaway was not entitled to lift the stay, dismiss the disqualification proceedings, set aside the disqualification undertaking, or obtain the declaration sought.

2. Article 6 rights are separate. A breach of the reasonable-time guarantee does not itself impugn the fairness or outcome of the trial. Following Attorney General's Reference (No 2 of 2001) [2004] 2 AC 72, dismissal or a stay is justified only where a fair hearing is no longer possible or continuation would otherwise be unfair. The Strasbourg award provided full and just satisfaction for the established breach and could not itself found further relief.

3. The earlier decision of the Vice-Chancellor could not be reopened. Even if corrected by the later authorities, the correct consequence of the reasonable-time breach would have been compensation rather than dismissal, because no inability to secure a fair trial or collateral prejudice had been alleged at the relevant time. The Carecraft undertaking was binding and its condition was satisfied when permission for judicial review was refused.

4. General liberty to apply enabled the court to enforce the order or make adjustments for contemplated or unforeseen events. It did not confer jurisdiction to review the judgment or reverse the relief granted. The fact that the order imposed a stay rather than discontinuance was immaterial in the events which occurred.

5. Section 8A of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 applies only while the undertaking remains in force. It permits reduction of the remaining period or prospective cessation, but does not retrospectively annul an undertaking which has expired. Rule 7.47(1) of the Insolvency Rules also supplied no basis for reopening the undertaking because no special circumstances were shown.

6. The professional bodies were entitled to decide what significance to attach to the admitted conduct and expired undertaking. The court would not erase those events from the historical record. The application was dismissed.

Not stated in the judgment as an appeal from the present decision. The judgment records earlier decisions in the same litigation, including the dismissal of the Strike-Out Application by the Vice-Chancellor and subsequent refusal of permission to appeal.