Robinson, R (on the application of) v Sutton Coldfield Magistrates' Court

Time limits in criminal procedure rules must be observed, but a court retains a discretion to extend them after expiry. The discretion is not confined to exceptional cases. The court should closely scrutinise the explanation for default and consider any prejudice to the defendant, together with the overriding objective.

A hearsay statement from a fearful witness may be admitted where the statutory conditions are met and admission is in the interests of justice. There is no absolute rule excluding evidence merely because it is the sole or decisive evidence. The court must assess fairness in the circumstances, including the quality and reliability of the evidence, the opportunity to challenge it, the reasons for the witness’s absence and any available protective measures.

The claimant sought judicial review of his conviction for assault occasioning actual bodily harm at Sutton Coldfield Magistrates' Court. The prosecution had served notice of its intention to adduce bad-character evidence out of time and had sought to read the complainant’s statement under section 116(2)(e) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.

The magistrates extended time, admitted evidence of two previous convictions and permitted the complainant’s statement to be read. The claimant alleged procedural unfairness, improper consideration of the conviction details and infringement of the right to a fair trial. The central questions were whether the magistrates had lawfully exercised their procedural discretion and whether admission of the fearful witness’s statement was compatible with fairness.

1. Application dismissed. The magistrates’ decisions were lawful, and the stay of the Crown Court proceedings was lifted.
2. Under rule 35(8) of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2005, time limits must be observed, but the court may extend time after expiry. The discretion is not restricted to exceptional circumstances. The applicant for an extension must explain the default clearly, and the court should scrutinise that explanation closely. The court must also consider prejudice and the overriding objective.
3. The magistrates were entitled to admit the bad-character evidence despite the late notice. The explanation for delay was not wholly satisfactory, but there was no conceivable prejudice: the claimant knew the facts of his convictions, had notice that an application might be made and sought no adjournment. The magistrates’ awareness of the conviction details did not establish that they took those details into account when deciding whether to extend time.
4. Section 116(2)(e) and (4) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 require consideration of fear, the interests of justice and trial fairness. There is no absolute rule that a statement cannot be admitted where it is the sole or decisive evidence. The court must make a fact-sensitive assessment, including the nature of the fear, the quality and reliability of the evidence, the extent to which the defendant had an opportunity to address the allegation, the risk of unfairness and any appropriate special measures.
5. The complainant’s evidence was supported by photographs and aspects of the claimant’s police interview. The magistrates considered special measures and were entitled to conclude that the proposed arrangements for transporting the complainant were not measures under the relevant statutory provisions, particularly since the issue had not been raised before them. Their balancing of the defendant’s and complainant’s interests was one reasonably open to them and did not render the trial unfair.

This was a judicial review claim in the Administrative Court. The judgment does not state a separate prior appellate decision.