Director of Public Prosecutions v D

Under Road Traffic Act 1988, section 22A, the question whether an obstruction presents an obvious danger is assessed from the perspective of a reasonable bystander, not merely a careful driver travelling at the speed limit. The assessment must allow for the foreseeable presence of drivers who speed, fail to keep a proper lookout or follow too closely. A causal link between the obstruction and an accident is unnecessary for the offence.

The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed against a Youth Court decision dismissing an information after a submission of no case to answer. The respondent, aged 16 at the time, had placed an unauthorised road sign in a carriageway at night. The information alleged an offence under section 22A(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1988. The District Judge rejected the allegation that the circumstances made it obvious to a reasonable person that placing the sign was dangerous, applying the perspective of a careful driver travelling at the correct speed. The central issues were the proper meaning of obvious danger and whether the prosecution had to establish a causal connection with the subsequent fatal collision.

1. The appeal was allowed. The case was remitted to the Youth Court for a fresh hearing before a different District Judge or bench of magistrates.

2. Section 22A(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 applies where a person intentionally and without lawful authority or reasonable cause causes anything to be on or over a road in circumstances in which it would be obvious to a reasonable person that doing so would be dangerous.

3. Section 22A(2) requires danger to be assessed by reference to the risk of injury to a person, or serious damage to property, on or near the road. The reasonable person is a reasonable bystander, whether or not a motorist. That person cannot be assumed to expect all motorists to drive carefully and within the speed limit.

4. The fact that several careful motorists negotiated the sign safely did not prevent the obstruction from being obviously dangerous. The assessment had to recognise the risk that a motorist might be speeding, fail to keep a proper lookout, follow traffic too closely or otherwise drive badly. The prosecution did not need to prove that the sign caused the fatal accident.

5. The respondent’s interview answers were not given significant weight. Although section 22A(2) requires regard to circumstances within the accused’s knowledge, no specific relevant circumstance about the road or its use was shown to have been within the respondent’s knowledge.

6. The District Judge had been entitled to amend the information from the traffic-equipment offence under section 22A(1)(c) to the offence under section 22A(1)(a). The premature termination of the case justified remittal for a fresh trial rather than a direction to convict.

1. High Court (Administrative Court) — allowed the Director of Public Prosecutions’ appeal against the Youth Court decision and remitted the case for re-hearing before a different District Judge or bench of magistrates.
2. Bridport Youth Court — the District Judge dismissed the information after a submission of no case to answer.