Lloyd v Svenby

A registration mark is created by statute and does not generate a common-law right to the mark. Except for rights expressly provided by the statutory scheme, neither ownership nor historical use creates a right to a particular registration mark. The allocation of a mark is a matter for the Secretary of State, not the court. The court cannot be converted into a fact-finding agency to advise the executive on which vehicle has the better claim where no justiciable right or cause of action is in issue. Declaratory relief should also be refused where the proposed declaration would be incomplete, relative only to the litigants, or serve no proper adjudicative purpose.

The claimant and first defendant owned different historic Lister Jaguar cars which had, at different times and through an administrative misunderstanding, been associated with the registration mark WTM 446 and chassis number BHL126. The DVLA concluded that the competing claims were complex, contradictory and inconclusive, and withdrew the mark from both cars.

The claimant initially sought judicial review and later pursued declarations that his car had the better claim to the mark, together with declarations concerning the identity of the chassis. The defendant sought corresponding declarations and an injunction. The tortious claims were abandoned. The central issues were whether the court had a justiciable question to determine and whether declaratory relief should be granted.

1. The claim and counterclaim were dismissed. The court declined to make declarations concerning the registration mark or the authenticity of either chassis.
2. A car has no legal personality and cannot itself have a claim. A declaration could in principle be reformulated as a claim by one person against another, but that did not overcome the other jurisdictional objections.
3. The registration system is statutory. Under the Vehicle Excise and Registration Act 1994, any right to a particular registration mark must arise from the Act or an instrument made under it. Neither party relied on the statutory transfer or sale schemes, and there was no common-law right to the disputed mark.
4. The Secretary of State, acting through the DVLA, was the statutory decision-maker. The court could review the lawfulness of that decision, but could not replace the Secretary of State by deciding which vehicle had the better claim or by finding facts for the executive in the absence of a justiciable right. The request of the Secretary of State, the parties’ agreement, and the earlier procedural order could not confer jurisdiction that Parliament had not given the court.
5. The proposed declarations would require the court to select and apply no recognised legal criteria among numerous historical and factual considerations. They would be partial, potentially misleading, and binding only between the litigants. The court should not determine the authenticity of a chassis, or the history of an antiquity, unless necessary to resolve justiciable rights such as contractual rights.
6. Although the court’s power to grant declarations under CPR Part 40.20 is unfettered by statute or the CPR, its exercise requires consideration of justice to each party, usefulness, and any special reasons for granting or refusing relief. Those considerations pointed against relief here.