S, R (on the application of) v Hertfordshire County Council

In an appeal from a special educational needs tribunal, case-management directions made after an adjournment may restrict the issues and evidence to be addressed at the resumed hearing. A party’s entitlement to call oral evidence remains subject to those directions and to the tribunal’s control of its proceedings. Late written evidence is discretionary and may be refused where it is irrelevant to the remaining issues, would impede efficient conduct, or creates no serious risk of prejudice to the child. Brief reasons for an evidential ruling do not automatically invalidate the decision where the reasons are intelligible, or where the reviewing court can identify compelling reasons that justified the ruling without resulting unfairness.

This was an appeal under section 11 of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1996 against a decision of a Special Educational Needs and Disability Tribunal concerning the school named in H’s statement of special educational needs.

The tribunal had adjourned after reaching provisional conclusions and directed that the resumed hearing would principally address the suitability of a mainstream school proposed by Hertfordshire County Council. It refused to admit a late speech and language therapist’s report and oral evidence, and subsequently named Mount Grace School rather than St Catherine’s School. The issues before the High Court were whether those refusals were unlawful and whether the tribunal had insufficient evidence to conclude that Mount Grace was appropriate.

1. Appeal dismissed. The tribunal lawfully refused to admit both the written report and proposed oral evidence of Mrs O’Keefe. The order for public funding assessment was made.
2. Under regulation 35(2) of the Special Educational Needs Tribunal Regulations 2001, provisional conclusions and directions following an adjournment may define the issues remaining for decision. In ordinary circumstances, parties cannot use the resumed hearing to reopen issues already covered by those conclusions. The further evidence was directed principally to H’s needs and provision, whereas the remaining issue concerned the suitability of Mount Grace.
3. Regulation 34 gives parties an entitlement in principle to call oral evidence, subject to relevance, the limit on witnesses and the tribunal’s general case-management powers, including directions under regulation 35(2)(a). The tribunal was therefore entitled to exclude oral evidence which did not address the outstanding issue.
4. Regulation 33 confers a discretion concerning late written evidence. The report was served late, concerned matters substantially already dealt with, and was only tangentially related to the outstanding issue. Its admission could properly be regarded as contrary to the interests of justice and likely to impede efficient conduct. The exceptional route under regulation 33(3) was unavailable because the case was not wholly exceptional and exclusion created no serious risk of prejudice to H.
5. The tribunal’s reasons were concise but intelligible in the context of the procedural history. Even if inadequately expressed, that would not automatically require the decision to be quashed. Where the reviewing court is satisfied that compelling reasons in fact justified the ruling, remittal is unnecessary. The court also rejected the challenge to the evidence supporting Mount Grace: the tribunal had documentary evidence and evidence from officers with relevant knowledge, and no legal rule required evidence from a member of the school’s staff.

High Court (Administrative Court): appeal under section 11 of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1996 dismissed. The decision of the Special Educational Needs and Disability Tribunal naming Mount Grace School was upheld.