Gunasinghe v Henley Management College

Permission to apply for judicial review may be refused where, even if unlawfulness were established, the court could not grant any substantial public law remedy. This includes cases where the relationship between the parties has broken down and reinstatement would be inappropriate, leaving compensation as the realistic remedy. Permission may also be refused where delay has made the requested relief practically useless, particularly when the claimant failed to pursue an expedited hearing. A later decision based on later circumstances is a different decision and cannot simply be tested in proceedings challenging an earlier decision. An alternative domestic remedy may be relevant, but it need not be determined where other grounds independently justify refusal.

The claimant was enrolled on a modular MBA course requiring group workshops. After difficulties with fellow students, the College decided that she could not continue in the existing or another group for the 2005–06 academic year. She issued judicial review proceedings seeking to quash that decision and initially sought interim relief requiring her return to the course.

By the hearing, reinstatement during that academic year was no longer practicable. The claimant accepted that interim relief was pointless and sought an expedited substantive hearing. The central issues were whether permission should be granted and, if so, whether interim relief was available.

1. Permission refused. The court declined permission to apply for judicial review because the proceedings could not realistically result in substantial public law relief.
2. The College had concluded, on documentary material, that the claimant’s behaviour prevented effective work with the current intake and would disrupt fellow students if she remained in a group. The court did not decide whether that conclusion was correct or whether the process was fair. It found no realistic prospect that the court would compel continuation of a relationship which had broken down. Even if the decision were unlawful, the appropriate remedy, assuming a private law right, would be compensation.
3. Delay provided an independent reason for refusal. The relief sought concerned continuation of the course from the beginning of the 2005–06 academic year. The claimant should have pursued promptly the early hearing made available by earlier directions. By the time of the hearing, the requested remedy could no longer be useful.
4. The court did not determine the disputed questions concerning the College’s AR8 and AR9 procedures or whether an alternative remedy was available. It nevertheless observed that disputes of this kind are generally better addressed through a domestic procedure than court intervention.
5. A possible decision concerning admission for the following academic year would be a different decision, taken in different circumstances and potentially affected by the outcome of the complaints procedure. The present proceedings could not remain as a vehicle for challenging that later decision.
6. The claimant’s private law claims in contract and tort were directed to proceed as if started under CPR 7. The relevant part of the claim was transferred to the Queen’s Bench Division, with directions for Particulars of Claim, Defence and Reply under CPR 54.20 and CPR 30.5(2).

The judgment was a first-instance decision on an application for permission to apply for judicial review. Earlier directions had been made by Moses LJ and McCombe J for an expedited hearing of the permission and interim relief applications. No lower-court judgment was under appeal.