Romer, R (on the application of) v First Secretary of State & Anor

For the purposes of the four-year enforcement time limit, the relevant question is whether successive enforcement notices concern the same actual development or change of use. Different descriptions of the same development do not prevent reliance on the statutory provision. The provision does not, however, permit enforcement action concerning different physical developments or different changes of use.

A former workshop used by workmen as residential accommodation is not thereby a single dwelling house. The court must consider whether it formed a separate planning unit and whether later building works created a new planning unit and a new chapter in the planning history.

The claimant challenged an inspector’s decision concerning an enforcement notice issued by the London Borough of Haringey. An earlier notice had identified the wrong site and was quashed for uncertainty. A second notice alleged the unauthorised change of use of storage and garage areas and the erection of a single-storey building providing living accommodation.

The inspector rejected the claimant’s ground that enforcement was time-barred under Town and Country Planning Act 1990, section 171B(4)(b), and refused deemed planning permission. The central issues were whether the two notices related to the same development and whether an earlier mixed workshop and residential use had acquired immunity from enforcement.

1. The application was dismissed. The claimant was ordered to pay the First Secretary of State’s costs of £6,044.
2. Section 171B(4)(b) concerns the same actual development or breach of planning control, rather than the words used to describe it. Following Jarmain v SOSETR [2002] PLR 126, the provision cannot be used for two different physical developments or two different changes of use, but may apply where the same development is described in different ways.
3. The inspector was entitled to find that the first and second notices concerned essentially the same dwelling development. The differences in site description, wording, land registration and ownership did not alter the physical reality. The second enforcement action was therefore within section 171B(4)(b).
4. The argument based on earlier residential use also failed. The evidence did not establish that the workshop had been used as a separate single dwelling house. It was part of the curtilage and planning unit of number 221, and its use was said to be mixed residential and workshop use.
5. Further, if the new building incorporated the former building into a larger whole, it created a new planning unit and a new chapter in the planning history. The asserted earlier immunity therefore could not defeat enforcement.

1. Inspector’s first decision: the earlier enforcement notice was quashed because it identified the wrong site and was uncertain.
2. Inspector’s second decision: the appeal on ground (d) was dismissed, section 171B(4)(b) was applied, and deemed planning permission was refused.
3. High Court (Administrative Court): the challenge was dismissed and costs were ordered against the claimant.