Linkevicius v Prosecutor General's Office of the Republic of Lithuania

Delay bars extradition only where, in the circumstances of the particular case, return would be unjust or oppressive. The court must assess both prejudice to the accused in conducting the trial and hardship arising from changes in circumstances. Responsibility for the delay is relevant. Delay caused by the requested person’s flight, concealment or evasion will ordinarily count against reliance on the passage of time, save in exceptional circumstances. The court may consider how the requesting state’s trial process will address fading memories and other effects of delay. Personal development, employment, relationships and the disruption of facing trial do not, without more, establish oppression.

The claimant appealed under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against a District Judge’s order for his extradition to Lithuania under a European Arrest Warrant. The warrant alleged that he had participated in a robbery committed in October 1998. He had initially been remanded in custody, was later released on bail subject to a written pledge, and subsequently left Lithuania in breach of that pledge.

The District Judge found that the Lithuanian authorities had caused excessive delay between 2000 and 2004, but also found fault with the claimant’s departure. She concluded that there was no sufficient risk of trial prejudice or oppressive hardship. The central issue was whether extradition was barred by the passage of time under sections 11 and 14 of the Act.

1. Appeal dismissed. The claimant’s extradition was not barred by reason of the passage of time under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003.
2. The court applied the principles stated in Kakis v Government of the Republic of Cyprus [1978] 1 WLR 779. Unjustness is directed primarily to prejudice in the conduct of the trial. Oppressiveness concerns hardship resulting from changes in the accused’s circumstances. The two concepts overlap and together require an assessment of fairness.
3. Responsibility for delay is relevant. Delay caused by the requested person’s flight or breach of bail conditions cannot ordinarily be relied upon to establish injustice or oppression. The period after the claimant’s departure therefore counted against him.
4. The District Judge was entitled to find no significant risk of prejudice. The claimant knew the charge, had been arrested at the time, had legal representation, and had ample opportunity to secure evidence. Fading memories affected prosecution and defence alike and could be assessed in the trial process. It was also permissible to consider how the Lithuanian trial process would address such matters.
5. The claimant’s age, work, improved English, relationship and life in England did not amount to dramatic or sufficiently material changes of circumstance. The seriousness of the alleged offence and the absence of any misleading conduct by the authorities supported the District Judge’s conclusion that return would not be oppressive.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal against the City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court extradition decision was dismissed.
• City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court: On 24 October 2006, District Judge Tubbs ordered extradition to Lithuania.