Flegg v Justices of the Peace for the New Forest Local Justice Area Sitting At Lyndhurst

A person served with a notice under section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 must provide the driver's name and details, or other information in their power which may lead to identification. A general statement that the driver cannot be identified is insufficient where the keeper knows the possible drivers and can provide information about them. An inaccurate or misleading response does not comply with the notice. The statutory defence under section 172(4) cannot assist a person who failed to provide available identification information within the required period. Justices may refuse to state a case where the proposed question does not arise on their findings.

The claimant was convicted by the defendant justices of failing to comply with a notice under section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 requiring information identifying the rider of his motorcycle. He had stated that more than one person used the motorcycle, but did not identify himself or Dr Sepp as possible riders within the 28-day period.

The justices refused to state a case, finding that he knew Dr Sepp was the only other possible driver and had failed to provide his details. The claimant sought judicial review, arguing that he had not failed to comply with section 172(2), or alternatively that he could rely on the defence in section 172(4). The central issue was whether the notice had been complied with and, if not, whether the statutory defence was available.

1. The claim was dismissed. The justices were entitled to refuse to state a case. The proposed question did not arise on their findings.
2. The notice required the claimant to provide the full name and address of the actual driver, or information capable of leading to identification. He provided neither. His failure therefore constituted non-compliance with section 172(2)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988. The approach in Jones v Director of Public Prosecutions, [2004] RTR 20, was consistent with that conclusion: a covering letter may comply with the statutory requirement so far as it goes, but failure to name the driver remains non-compliance.
3. In the alternative, the notice required information under section 172(2)(b), or a further lawful requirement under section 172(2)(a), which could lead to identification. The claimant could have stated that only he and Dr Sepp had used the motorcycle and that he did not believe he had been the rider. His failure to provide that information was a further breach.
4. The response was also inaccurate and misleading in light of the facts found by the justices. A response to the request to explain why driver details could not be supplied had to be accurate. An inaccurate or misleading response did not constitute compliance.
5. The defence under section 172(4) did not arise. The claimant possessed information which he could and should have supplied within the 28-day period. The justices were entitled to infer that he believed Dr Sepp was the driver, notwithstanding Dr Sepp's inability to remember whether he had ridden the motorcycle.

The judgment itself records that the claimant had been convicted by the defendant justices and that they refused his request to state a case on the ground that it was frivolous. The Administrative Court dismissed the judicial review claim and ordered the claimant to pay the CPS's costs, subject to detailed assessment if not agreed.