R, R (on the application of) v Manchester City Youth Court

When deciding whether a person under 18 should be tried summarily, magistrates must ask whether there is a real possibility of a custodial sentence exceeding two years. The assessment must be grounded in the facts, the offender’s age and circumstances, and the applicable sentencing guidance. A dwelling-house burglary does not automatically justify declining youth-court jurisdiction. Examining justices who have begun their inquiry may reconsider the mode of trial at any time. That power is not fettered by an earlier decision of different justices, particularly where examination of the case shows that the earlier decision was wrong.

A 15-year-old defendant admitted a dwelling-house burglary and indicated a guilty plea at the earliest opportunity. The Youth Court declined summary jurisdiction, apparently because the offence involved a dwelling house and property worth nearly £6,000. At later committal proceedings, the court refused to reconsider that decision, believing that doing so would amount to appellate review of the earlier decision. The claimant sought judicial review, arguing that the threshold in section 24 of the Magistrates Courts Act 1980 was not met and that section 25 permitted reconsideration. The central issues were whether there was a real possibility of detention exceeding two years and whether the Youth Court could revisit its mode-of-trial decision.

1. The decisions were quashed. The Youth Court’s decisions of 15 December 2005 and 26 January 2006 were quashed. The case was directed to proceed to summary trial in the Youth Court.
2. Under section 24 of the Magistrates Courts Act 1980, the magistrates had to determine whether there was a real possibility that the claimant could receive a custodial sentence exceeding two years. The principles governing that assessment had recently been set out in R(W, S and B) v the Brent Youth Court, the Enfield Crown Court and the Richmond on Thames Youth Court [2006] EWHC 95 Admin.
3. The applicable sentencing guidance for domestic burglary was considered in R v McInerney and Keating [2002] EWCA Crim 3003; [2003] 2 Crim App R (S) 39. The claimant’s case was a standard burglary without high-level aggravating features. He was 15, had no previous convictions, admitted the offence, assisted the police and pleaded guilty promptly. There was no real possibility of detention exceeding two years. The initial refusal of jurisdiction therefore rested on a significantly erroneous assessment.
4. Sections 25(5) and 25(7) enabled examining justices, once they had begun to inquire into the case, to reconsider the mode of trial at any time during the inquiry. Their jurisdiction could not be fettered by an earlier decision which their own examination showed to be wrong. The Youth Court therefore adopted an impermissibly narrow approach when it refused to reconsider the decision on the ground that it lacked appellate power.
5. Because the first decision was quashed, the later decision also proceeded on a manifestly false basis and was quashed for that reason independently.

There was a detailed assessment of the claimant’s publicly funded costs.

The judgment describes two prior Youth Court decisions:

• Youth Court, 15 December 2005: declined summary jurisdiction under section 24 of the Magistrates Courts Act 1980.
• Youth Court, 26 January 2006: refused to reconsider the mode-of-trial decision under section 25 of the Magistrates Courts Act 1980.
• High Court (Administrative Court): quashed both decisions and directed that the case proceed to summary trial.