Murchison v Southend Magistrates' Court

A magistrates’ conviction is not rendered legally ineffective merely because, after agreeing the verdict and recording their reasons, the justices learn of the defendant’s previous convictions before announcing the decision in open court. The court must assess whether the disclosure created actual injustice or a sufficiently substantial perception of bias. Where the justices’ deliberations and written reasons were complete before disclosure, and the disclosure was corrected almost immediately in open court, quashing was unjustified. The court nevertheless gave procedural guidance: advice on sentence and access to antecedents should follow the announcement of the verdict and the defendant’s sentencing representations.

The claimant sought judicial review of his conviction for common assault by Southend-on-Sea Magistrates’ Court. After the magistrates had retired, agreed the verdict and recorded their reasons, their legal adviser told them that the claimant had previous convictions and sought provisional sentencing views. The conviction and reasons were then announced in open court.

The central issue was whether the conviction was invalid, or should be quashed for apparent bias or injustice, because the magistrates learned of the claimant’s record before formally announcing the verdict.

1. Appeal dismissed. The evidence established that the magistrates had agreed both their verdict and its reasons, and had reduced those reasons into writing, before learning of the claimant’s previous convictions. Their silence in response to the legal adviser’s evidence was treated as assent to that account.
2. The court distinguished the authorities in which a magistrate had known, or might have known, the accused’s record before verdict. Those cases concerned the possible effect of antecedents on deliberations. Here there was no evidence that the magistrates’ deliberations had been affected.
3. The principle in R v Coates was not determinative. Although a decision does not have legal effect until announced in open court, this case involved a verdict and reasons that had already been agreed and recorded before the disclosure.
4. The relevant question was whether the disclosure created actual injustice or a perception of bias or injustice sufficient to justify quashing an otherwise lawful conviction. The short interval before the matter was corrected in open court made that consequence insufficiently substantial.
5. Lady Justice Hallett advised that legal advice on sentence should ordinarily be given only after the verdict had been announced, antecedents disclosed and sentencing representations heard. Legal advisers should attend retiring magistrates only when called upon, and should not take the defendant’s convictions into the retiring room.

The judgment does not state a prior appellate decision. It concerns judicial review of a conviction by Southend-on-Sea Magistrates’ Court.