Cadman, Re Criminal Justice Act 2003

When fixing a minimum term under Schedule 22 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the High Court must make its own assessment of the appropriate period. It must have regard to the statutory starting points, earlier judicial recommendations and the notified tariff, while respecting the statutory cap. Judicial recommendations may carry greater weight than executive decisions, particularly where the tariff was previously determined by the executive in breach of Article 6. Exceptional progress in custody is relevant and should be taken into account, but it principally concerns future risk and does not reduce the seriousness of the offence. Any reduction should remain broadly consistent with the previous practice of allowing one or two years for exceptional progress.

John Cadman, serving a life sentence for three murders committed during burglaries of elderly victims, applied under paragraph 3 of Schedule 5 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 for the setting of a minimum term. His tariff had been reduced by the Home Secretary from 30 years to 25 years. The trial judge had recommended 15 years and the Lord Chief Justice 18 years.

The application concerned the meaning of the statutory requirement to have regard to the competing tariff periods and whether the applicant’s sustained rehabilitation, remorse and reduction in risk amounted to exceptional progress which could justify a reduction.

1. The court held that the general principles in Schedule 21 include the numerical starting points specified there. The applicant’s offences fell within the particularly high seriousness category, involving three murders, murders of two or more persons for gain, and particularly vulnerable victims. The statutory starting point was therefore 30 years.

2. Schedule 22 required the court to have regard to the 30-year Schedule 21 starting point, the trial judge’s 15-year recommendation, the Lord Chief Justice’s 18-year recommendation and the Home Secretary’s notified term of 25 years. Although the court could not exceed the notified term, it had to make its own judgment rather than simply adopt one of those figures.

3. The judicial recommendation deserved greater weight than the Home Secretary’s decision. The Lord Chief Justice had considerable experience of tariff recommendations and had considered the case judicially. In addition, the executive determination of the applicant’s tariff had infringed Article 6, which required determination by an independent judiciary. Fairness also militated against giving substantial weight to later increases in tariff periods.

4. The applicant had made exceptional progress. The relevant features included an exemplary disciplinary and work record, genuine remorse, successful completion of offence-related and other courses, a substantial reduction in risk, sustained progress over a lengthy period and in different establishments, and good works for the benefit of others. Such progress was not excluded by Schedule 22 and had to be taken into account.

5. Exceptional progress principally concerned risk on release and did not diminish the seriousness of the murders. The reduction should not substantially exceed the one or two years formerly allowed by the Home Secretary. Without exceptional progress the appropriate term would have been 21 years; a two-year reduction was appropriate. Early-release provisions were ordered to apply after 19 years, less 15 months and four days spent on remand.

First-instance application in the Administrative Court under paragraph 3 of Schedule 5 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The judgment refers to the earlier tariff recommendations and Home Secretary decisions but does not identify an appeal from a lower court.