Crown Prosecution Service v T

An anti-social behaviour order must contain precise, targeted and proportionate prohibitions expressed in terms the subject can readily understand. A prohibition simply forbidding a person to act in an anti-social manner, without definition or limitation, is too vague and overly broad to be enforceable. However, a court dealing with an alleged breach should not strike down or treat as invalid an existing order. The order remains in force until set aside or varied through the proper procedure. The court should instead consider whether the conduct amounted to a breach, whether there was reasonable excuse, and whether any penalty was appropriate.

The Crown Prosecution Service appealed by case stated from a decision of the Manchester City Youth Court. The District Judge dismissed a charge of breaching an anti-social behaviour order, holding that a prohibition against acting in an anti-social manner throughout Manchester was vague, unclear and unenforceable.

The order had been made when the respondent was aged 13. The alleged breach arose from interference with a motor vehicle at premises outside the areas specified by the order. The central issues were whether the District Judge could rule on the validity of the order during breach proceedings and whether the prohibition was sufficiently clear and specific.

1. Appeal allowed in part. The District Judge had no jurisdiction in breach proceedings to declare the original anti-social behaviour order invalid or to strike out its paragraph 1. An order made by a court of competent jurisdiction must ordinarily be obeyed unless and until set aside or varied on appeal or application.

2. The principle in Boddington v British Transport Police [1999] 2 AC 143 did not govern an anti-social behaviour order. That decision concerned the ability to challenge the validity of a byelaw or administrative decision where the defendant might otherwise lack a fair opportunity to do so. An anti-social behaviour order has defined avenues of appeal and variation.

3. The court respectfully declined to follow R (W) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2005] EWHC 1333 (Admin) insofar as it treated a prohibition as plainly invalid merely because it was plainly too wide. Any challenge to the order’s validity should ordinarily be made by appeal or application to vary. The court dealing with an alleged breach could nevertheless consider whether the wording lacked sufficient clarity, whether that gave rise to reasonable excuse, and whether a penalty was appropriate.

4. The District Judge was substantively right that paragraph 1 was unacceptable. The prohibition was not precise or targeted, did not sufficiently identify the conduct prohibited, and omitted even the explanatory words in the statutory definition. A child aged between 13 and 15 could not be assumed to understand its scope. Such a prohibition should never again be included in an anti-social behaviour order. The court endorsed the principles in B v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset [2001] 1 WLR 340 and the subsequent guidance and authorities, including R v Boness and others [2005] EWCA Crim 2395.

5. The order remained in force when the alleged breach proceedings were heard. The District Judge should have determined whether there was a breach and, if so, whether a penalty was justified. In the particular circumstances, however, no additional penalty should have been imposed because the respondent had already been sentenced for the underlying vehicle-interference offence. The court therefore declined to quash the decision or remit the matter.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The prosecution appeal by case stated was allowed on the jurisdictional issue, but the court declined to quash the District Judge’s decision or remit the case because no additional penalty would have been appropriate.
• Manchester City Youth Court: The charge of breaching the anti-social behaviour order was dismissed because paragraph 1 was considered vague, unclear and unenforceable.