Campbell v Safra

On an application for summary judgment, a claimant must provide an evidential basis for alleging responsibility for publication. Bare assertion, suspicion and belief are insufficient where the inherent probabilities point the other way. Summary judgment on a defence is appropriate only where the facts are clear and do not require trial investigation. A claimant alleging inducement to breach of contract must plead direct inducement, or indirect inducement by unlawful means, together with the required intention to cause economic harm. Awareness that conduct may cause economic loss is insufficient. Protecting one’s reputation from apparently defamatory allegations is a legitimate interest and does not, without more, evidence the necessary intention.

The claimant, an author, sued the defendant in libel and for inducing the claimant’s publisher to breach its publishing contract. The libel claim alleged that the defendant was responsible for an article stating that the principal character in the claimant’s novel was based on the defendant’s life and had murdered two husbands. The claimant relied on an earlier newspaper article and a solicitor’s complaint to the publisher as links to the later publication.

The defendant denied responsibility and applied under CPR Part 24 for summary judgment, and sought to strike out the inducement claim. The issues were whether there was evidence from which responsibility for publication could be inferred, whether the pleaded defences were unanswerable, and whether the inducement pleading disclosed the essential ingredients of the tort.

1. Libel. The claimant had produced no evidence supporting the inference that the defendant was responsible, directly or indirectly, for the publication complained of. Suspicion and bare assertion were insufficient, and the inherent probabilities pointed against involvement. A basic ingredient of the claim was therefore missing, so the defendant was entitled to summary judgment on the libel claim.
2. On an application of this kind, pleaded facts should generally be assumed in the claimant’s favour, subject to written evidence showing an allegation to be indisputably false. The question is whether a properly directed jury could draw the proposed inference. The judge should not conduct a mini-trial where legitimate factual argument or the possibility of useful cross-examination remains.
3. The defendant’s alternative arguments did not independently justify summary judgment. A possible reply-to-attack privilege depended on facts which were disputed. Fair comment could not safely be determined because the allegation that the novel was based on the defendant’s life was arguably a verifiable fact rather than opinion. The striking similarities might strongly support justification, but the claimant’s account that they were coincidental remained a matter for trial.
4. Inducement. The pleading failed to allege direct inducement, indirect inducement by unlawful means, or an intention to cause economic harm either as an end or as a necessary means of an ulterior motive. Mere knowledge that conduct was likely to cause economic harm was insufficient. The defendant’s complaint to the publisher was directed to protecting her reputation and integrity, interests recognised by Article 8 of the Convention and accommodated within Article 10(2). Such bona fide protection of reputation could not ordinarily found satellite litigation for inducing breach of contract.
5. The defendant accordingly succeeded on both causes of action.