Hare v Marcar & Anor

A court hearing an appeal against a disciplinary sanction imposed by a local-government standards tribunal should not interfere merely because it might have imposed a different penalty. Intervention requires an error of principle or a penalty that is plainly wrong, with due deference to the tribunal’s expertise.

Suspension may be appropriate where misconduct is sufficiently grave to require public reassurance and to impress its seriousness on the respondent, particularly where there is concern about repetition. The tribunal may consider aggravating features including the seriousness of allegations made against public officers, failure to apologise, lack of insight and the risk of further breaches. Penalties should remain broadly consistent, but comparison depends on the circumstances of each case.

The appellant was an elected independent member of Bedford Borough Council. A Case Tribunal drawn from the Adjudication Panel for England found that he had breached paragraph 2(b) of the Code of Conduct by failing to treat council officers with respect in a letter making serious allegations against them.

The Tribunal imposed six months’ suspension. The appellant appealed under section 79(15) of the Local Government Act 2000, challenging the sanction on procedural and substantive grounds. He did not challenge the finding of breach. The central issues were whether the Tribunal had acted improperly in receiving submissions on sanction and whether the suspension was excessive or plainly wrong.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Tribunal’s six-month suspension was not plainly wrong and there was no procedural error warranting intervention.
2. The court accepted the relevant principles in the Adjudication Panel’s Guidance. Sanctions are directed both to preventing future non-compliance by the respondent and to discouraging similar conduct by others. Suspension is appropriate where the circumstances are insufficiently serious for disqualification but sufficiently grave to reassure the public and demonstrate the seriousness of the misconduct.
3. The court followed the approach stated by Sullivan J in Neville Sanders v Steven Kingston [2005] EWHC 2132 Admin: the court should not interfere with the Tribunal’s penalty unless there has been an error of principle or the penalty is plainly wrong, while giving due deference to the Tribunal’s expertise.
4. The Tribunal was entitled to treat the absence of a proper apology, the appellant’s lack of understanding and insight, the grave allegations of essentially criminal conduct against professional council officers, and the risk of repetition as aggravating features. It was also entitled to rely on its assessment of the appellant after hearing him give submissions.
5. The comparison with Neville Sanders v Steven Kingston [2003] EWHC 213 (Admin) did not assist the appellant. The conduct there was materially less serious and involved substantial mitigation. The present allegations were repeated, serious and directed against professional officers said to have deliberately lied and misled others. Although consistency between penalties is desirable, the circumstances differed substantially.
6. The Tribunal was entitled to impose an immediate suspension. The appeal was therefore dismissed.

1. Case Tribunal, Adjudication Panel for England: found a breach of paragraph 2(b) of the Code of Conduct and imposed six months’ suspension on 11 November 2005, issuing full reasons on 28 November 2005.
2. High Court (Administrative Court): dismissed the appeal under section 79(15) of the Local Government Act 2000.