Case details
Summary
In possession proceedings against a successor secure tenant under Ground 16 of Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1985, the tenant’s family composition and housing needs are determined at the date of the hearing, not the date of succession. This approach applies both to whether the existing dwelling is more extensive than reasonably required and to whether suitable alternative accommodation will be available.
The court must examine the reality of any family member’s occupation. A temporary move intended merely to defeat the claim need not establish a genuine housing requirement. Suitable alternative accommodation need not have been formally offered before the hearing; evidence that it will be available when the possession order takes effect is sufficient.
Factual background
The respondent succeeded to his grandfather’s secure periodic tenancy of a four-bedroom house. The local authority sought possession under Ground 16 of Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1985, contending that the house was more extensive than he reasonably required. After succession, his mother and half-sister moved into the property.
A deputy district judge disregarded their needs because they had not lived there at the date of succession, held that a one-bedroom flat was suitable alternative accommodation and ordered possession. His Honour Judge Birtles allowed the tenant’s appeal and dismissed the claim, holding that family composition was determined at the hearing.
On the authority’s second appeal, the central issue was whether the relevant family members and their needs were determined at succession or at the possession hearing.
Held
Appeal dismissed unanimously. The composition of a successor secure tenant’s family for Ground 16 and paragraph 1 of Part IV of Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1985 is determined at the date of the possession hearing, not at the date of succession. Jacob LJ and Sir Anthony Clarke MR agreed with Dyson LJ.
The three statutory conditions were to be read coherently. Reasonableness under section 84(2)(c) depends on all relevant circumstances at the hearing. Suitable alternative accommodation must be available when the order takes effect, which is later than the hearing. It would create an unexplained mismatch to assess whether the existing dwelling was more extensive than reasonably required by reference to a different family unit fixed at succession.
Paragraph 1 of Part IV applies to possession claims under Grounds 9–16 and must have the same meaning for each ground. Succession is ordinarily irrelevant to Grounds 9–15. The paragraph therefore could not refer to the family composition at succession. The authority’s interpretation would also require words to be inserted into unqualified statutory language, although no such insertion was needed to avoid absurdity.
Fixing family composition at succession could itself produce absurdity. Family members present at succession might leave before the hearing, yet their former needs would continue to govern both under-occupation and alternative accommodation. That result would obstruct Ground 16’s purpose of preventing under-occupation of social housing.
Post-succession occupation by family members is lawful and may naturally follow the previous tenant’s death. The possibility of abuse did not justify departing from the statutory language. The authority and the court may investigate when and why family members moved in, how long they intend to remain and whether they have other accommodation. Temporary occupation designed to defeat proceedings may fail to establish that the tenant genuinely requires the additional space.
The case was remitted to a district judge to determine whether reasonably suitable accommodation would be available for the tenant, his mother and half-sister when any order took effect. Section 84(2)(c) requires availability, not a completed offer before the hearing. The authority could therefore seek to prove that a suitable three-bedroom dwelling would be available.
The court’s approach to earlier authorities
This feature is available to zoomLaw Pro members.
Appellate history
- Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The local authority’s second appeal was dismissed unanimously. The case was remitted to a district judge to determine whether reasonably suitable alternative accommodation would be available for the tenant and his family.
- Mayor’s and City of London County Court: His Honour Judge Birtles allowed the tenant’s appeal and dismissed the possession claim. He held that family composition was determined at the hearing and that a one-bedroom flat could not meet the needs of a three-person family.
- County Court: Deputy District Judge Ryan ordered possession. He assessed family composition at succession, disregarded the tenant’s mother and half-sister and held that a one-bedroom flat was suitable alternative accommodation.
Lower court decision
Key cases cited
This feature is available to zoomLaw Pro members.
Cases citing this case
This feature is available to zoomLaw Pro members.