Collidge v Freeport Plc

Permission to appeal against findings of fact should be refused where the trial judge gave careful reasons and the findings were supported by evidence. Conflicting evidence, or evidence which does not point in one direction, does not itself justify appellate intervention. A challenge must disclose a proper basis for asserting that the findings were unsupported, against the weight of the evidence, perverse or plainly wrong. A proposed challenge to one evidential finding will not open a wider factual appeal where other independent evidence supports the relevant conclusions.

Collidge v Freeport Plc arose from a claim by the appellant, a former chief executive of the respondent company, for benefits under a compromise agreement dated 31 March 2006. The respondent relied on a warranty that there were no circumstances amounting to a repudiatory breach of the appellant’s employment contract. Mr Justice Jack held that the warranty was a condition of entitlement and was untrue, and dismissed the claim by order dated 25 May 2007.

Rix LJ granted permission to appeal on the construction of the compromise agreement and consequential legal issues, but refused permission in relation to the factual findings. The appellant renewed that application before the Court of Appeal, challenging findings concerning evidence from a former driver, alleged inducement of a retraction, forged loan agreements and other alleged breaches of the employment contract.

1. The renewed application for permission to appeal against the factual findings was refused. Rimer LJ delivered the judgment, and Gage LJ agreed.

2. The Court accepted that the evidence did not point unerringly in one direction. That circumstance did not establish an arguable appeal. The trial judge had given a careful and detailed judgment and was entitled to resolve the conflicts in the evidence after hearing the witnesses and considering the documents.

3. The proposed challenge to the findings concerning the former driver’s retraction and the two loan agreements disclosed no realistic prospect of success. The judge was entitled to find that the retraction had been induced by a promised payment and that the loan agreements were forgeries, despite inconsistencies including a text message which he could not explain.

4. There was no proper basis for asserting that the findings were unsupported by evidence, against the weight of the evidence, perverse or plainly wrong. Nor was there an arguable basis for opening a wider challenge to the findings concerning the alleged breaches of the employment contract. Other evidence independently corroborated several matters, and some findings did not depend on the former driver’s evidence at all.

5. The Court therefore refused permission to appeal on the factual grounds. The existing permission on construction of clause 7(b) and consequential legal issues was unaffected.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 5 October 2007, the renewed application for permission to appeal against the factual findings was refused. Rix LJ had previously granted permission on the construction of the compromise agreement and consequential legal issues, while refusing permission on the factual grounds.
• High Court of Justice: Mr Justice Jack dismissed the claim by order dated 25 May 2007, holding that the clause 7(b) warranty was a condition of entitlement and that it was untrue.