MH (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Permission to appeal may be granted where an asylum tribunal’s adverse credibility finding arguably rests on a misreading or incomplete treatment of objective country material. Material evidence that is consistent with an applicant’s account must be addressed before inconsistency with the objective evidence can properly support an adverse finding. A separate ground is not arguable where the issue was not canvassed before the tribunal, was not supported by specific evidence, and was not the subject of submissions. The court may therefore grant permission on one ground while refusing it on another.

The appellant challenged an Immigration Judge’s reconsidered determination, promulgated on 7 March 2007 under Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, which dismissed his appeal against refusal of refugee recognition and consequential removal directions. The appellant relied on his claimed pro-monarchist activities in Iran and subsequent political activities in the United Kingdom.

A single judge and a Lord Justice had refused permission on identical grounds. On renewal, the Court of Appeal considered whether two proposed grounds were arguable: first, that the Immigration Judge had failed to address objective material said to be consistent with the appellant’s account; and secondly, that the judge had failed to assess the risk arising from the appellant’s professed determination to continue his political activities.

1. First ground—permission granted. The Immigration Judge made adverse credibility findings on the basis that the appellant’s account of his activities before June 2000 was inconsistent with objective material stating that monarchist groups were not active through public meetings or leaflet distribution. However, the 1998 UNHCR background report was at least consistent with the appellant having gone underground and acted covertly. The later 2002 material might support the judge’s conclusion, but the material relating to 2000 did not. The determination did not address that distinction. It was therefore arguable that the credibility findings were based on inconsistency with objective evidence when the relevant material did not support that conclusion.
2. Second ground—permission refused. The proposed argument concerning the consequences of the appellant’s United Kingdom political activities and his professed willingness to make sacrifices for his principles had not been properly canvassed before the Immigration Judge. There was no indication of evidence specifically directed to the issue, no submissions had been made on it, and any argument appeared to have been an afterthought or brief footnote. There was accordingly no arguable basis for concluding that the Immigration Judge had erred.
3. Order. Permission to appeal was granted on the first reasons ground and refused on the second.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division)—renewed application for permission to appeal from the Immigration Judge’s reconsidered determination, which dismissed the appeal against refusal of refugee recognition and consequential removal directions. Permission was granted on the first reasons ground and refused on the second.
• Earlier permission decisions—a single judge and a Lord Justice had refused permission on identical grounds.