MW (Liberia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Under Rule 297(v) of the Immigration Rules, a child seeking entry to join a parent must be maintained by that parent without recourse to public funds. Genuine voluntary financial gifts from third parties, whether paid directly to the child or channelled through the parent, do not ordinarily satisfy that requirement because the parent is only acting as a conduit. The court declined to define the rule’s wider boundaries, recognising that legally enforceable support, such as money payable under a deed of covenant or court order, might require separate consideration. Article 8 proportionality must be assessed on adequate factual findings and with proper regard to the governing principles.

MW, a child living in Ghana, appealed against the dismissal of her application to enter the United Kingdom to join her mother under Rule 297(v) of the Immigration Rules. The mother relied on benefits and voluntary financial support from friends to maintain MW. On reconsideration, the Tribunal accepted that the support was genuine and sufficient but held that its voluntary nature meant it did not qualify as the parent’s own means. The Tribunal also dismissed the Article 8 claim without making adequate findings about MW’s living conditions or properly addressing proportionality. The appeal concerned the meaning of maintenance by the parent under Rule 297(v), and whether the Article 8 issue could be determined without further fact-finding.

1. Immigration Rules appeal dismissed. Rule 297(v) required the child to be maintained by the parent whom she was seeking to join, without recourse to public funds. The ordinary meaning of the provision did not permit entry whenever adequate third-party support was available.
2. Voluntary and genuine gifts from third parties did not become the parent’s income or assets merely because they were paid to the parent and then used to support the child. In such circumstances, the parent was unable to maintain the child independently and acted only as a conduit for the donors. The same conclusion applied whether the support was paid directly to the child or through the parent.
3. The court declined to determine the full boundaries of Rule 297(v). Financial support payable under a deed of covenant or court order might qualify if the obligation to pay was being, or was likely to be, met. The decision was confined to voluntary arrangements of the kind considered in this case.
4. The exclusion of such voluntary third-party arrangements was not inconsistent with Article 8 and was not unlawful, unreasonable or ultra vires. The Immigration Authorities were entitled to require proof that the parent had adequate means, taking account of the parent’s legal obligation, incentive to maintain the child, and the greater precariousness and verification difficulties of voluntary third-party support.
5. Article 8 appeal allowed and remitted. The Secretary of State accepted that the Tribunal had failed to make material findings about MW’s conditions in Ghana and had not properly addressed the relevant proportionality principles, including those identified in AG (Eritrea) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWCA Civ. 80. The Article 8 claim was remitted to the Tribunal for reconsideration.
6. Lawrence Collins LJ agreed with the order and expressed the hope that the rule might be amended to facilitate reunion where there was verifiable evidence of long-term third-party support.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): dismissed the appeal under Rule 297(v), allowed the Article 8 appeal, and remitted the Article 8 claim to the Tribunal.
• Asylum and Immigration Tribunal: on reconsideration, IJ Davey dismissed the appeal under Rule 297(v) and rejected the Article 8 claim. The Article 8 decision was accepted to contain a material error of law.
• Asylum and Immigration Tribunal: IJ Kaler had previously dismissed the appeal, including the Rule 297(v) and Article 8 claims.