S (A Child)

In urgent child-protection proceedings, urgency does not justify dispensing wholesale with ordinary procedural safeguards when considering an interim care order or a psychiatric-assessment direction. The judge must address material evidence, including expert disagreement about the immediacy and manner of assessment. Failure to consider an expert’s contrary view may invalidate the orders. The proper course is to set them aside and direct a fresh urgent hearing on a complete evidential and procedural basis.

The local authority applied for an interim care order concerning an 11-year-old child and for a direction under section 38(6) of the Children Act 1989 requiring an in-patient psychiatric assessment. The proceedings were transferred to the High Court because the authority also sought treatment under the court’s inherent jurisdiction. HHJ Collins made both orders urgently on 16 March 2007, without the parents having anticipated the application and without several usual procedural safeguards. The mother appealed. The father and child supported the appeal, and the local authority did not resist it. The central issues were whether the judge had been entitled to proceed in that manner and whether he had properly considered conflicting expert evidence concerning the need for immediate intervention.

The appeal was allowed. Lord Justice Wilson delivered the principal judgment, with Lord Justices Buxton and Moses agreeing.

1. The orders committing the child to the local authority’s interim care and directing a 14-day in-patient psychiatric assessment under section 38(6) of the Children Act 1989 were set aside.
2. Although the case appeared urgent, the hearing had proceeded without the parents understanding that immediate orders might be sought, without witness statements, without sufficient opportunity for the Children’s Guardian to see the child and interview the parents, without an interim care plan, and without a document explaining how the threshold for an interim care order was said to be crossed. These were significant departures from normal procedural safeguards.
3. The most compelling error was the judge’s failure to consider the material disagreement between the psychiatrists. Dr Wannan considered immediate orders essential. Dr Saedi accepted that assessment was needed but considered that a short delay might secure the mother’s consent, which could improve the prospects of successful assessment and treatment. The judge made his decision without addressing Dr Saedi’s position.
4. A fresh and urgent hearing was required on a complete evidential basis. The matter was remitted to a full judge of the Family Division for reconsideration of the applications for an interim care order and for treatment under the inherent jurisdiction.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): appeal allowed; the orders were set aside and the applications were remitted for an urgent fresh hearing.
• High Court, Family Division: on 16 March 2007, HHJ Collins made an interim care order for 28 days and a direction under section 38(6) of the Children Act 1989 for a 14-day in-patient psychiatric assessment.