Chambers v Chambers

On an application for permission to appeal, permission may be confined to grounds disclosing a reasonably arguable error of principle. Grounds challenging findings or matters within the lower court’s proper function may be refused. Although an appeal ordinarily proceeds on the material before the lower court, permission may be made conditional on further evidence where omission of material correspondence makes it unsatisfactory to proceed. A stay may preserve property pending the appeal.

This was an application for permission to appeal from an order of District Judge Fink enforcing an earlier order for sale of jointly owned former matrimonial property. The appellant argued that a local authority repair charge registered in 1994 might be unenforceable under the Limitation Act, and challenged findings concerning acknowledgment in correspondence with the local government ombudsman. The central questions were whether the proposed grounds disclosed an arguable error of principle, whether the correspondence should be filed, and whether the property should be preserved pending any appeal.

Lord Justice Lloyd granted permission only on grounds 1, 2 and 3, refused permission on grounds 4, 5 and 6, and granted a stay pending the appeal.

1. The grounds concerning the local authority’s charge raised a reasonably arguable issue that the district judge might have erred in principle. The issues included whether correspondence with the local government ombudsman could amount to an acknowledgment under the Limitation Act, and the significance of the absence of an earlier limitation challenge.
2. The remaining grounds were refused. The district judge’s factual conclusions were within the proper scope of her functions and were properly reasoned.
3. Permission was conditional on the appellant filing and serving, in principle within 28 days, a witness statement exhibiting correspondence between him or anyone acting for him and the ombudsman concerning the charges. Although the appeal would ordinarily be considered on the material before the district judge, it was profoundly unsatisfactory that the correspondence had not been before her. Its relevance remained open, including whether correspondence sent to a third party could constitute acknowledgment or might have been passed to the local authority.
4. The stay was granted so that the property would remain unsold pending the appeal. The possible use of Law of Property Act, section 50, to set aside money against a disputed charge had not been explored.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 18 May 2007, permission to appeal from the Croydon County Court order of District Judge Fink dated 28 December 2006 was granted on grounds 1–3, refused on grounds 4–6, and a stay was granted pending appeal.