ZH (Lebanon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

An appellate court should defer to an expert asylum tribunal’s assessment of country evidence and the safety and reasonableness of internal relocation. A finding on those matters is ordinarily factual. Permission to appeal requires an arguable error of law, including perversity or a material misunderstanding of the evidence or the tribunal’s approach. A later change in country conditions may support a fresh asylum claim, but does not itself establish grounds of appeal against the earlier decision.

The appellant, a Palestinian habitual resident of Lebanon, claimed asylum and humanitarian relief after fearing violence from a militant faction in refugee camps where he had lived. An adjudicator dismissed his appeal, finding that he was not at risk on return and, alternatively, that he could safely and reasonably relocate to the Ein-al-Hilweh camp.

On reconsideration, the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal upheld the decision on internal relocation. The appellant challenged that conclusion as perverse, alleged that counsel’s concession had been misunderstood, and argued that the Tribunal had failed to give anxious scrutiny to the reasonableness of relocation. He renewed his application for an extension of time and permission to appeal.

1. Application refused. The renewed application for an extension of time and permission to appeal was dismissed.
2. The Asylum and Immigration Tribunal’s conclusion that relocation to the Ein-al-Hilweh camp was safe and reasonable was a finding of fact based on objective country evidence. The Tribunal had considered the proposed journey from Beirut and was entitled to take account of the appellant’s previous journey from the Beddawi camp to Syria.
3. The adjudicator’s decision was not founded on counsel’s concession. It was based on the evidence concerning conditions in the refugee camps. The alleged misunderstanding of the concession therefore did not disclose an arguable error of law.
4. As the expert tribunal, the Tribunal’s assessment required appellate deference. Unless an error of law could be identified in the adjudicator’s approach or in the Tribunal’s assessment of her conclusion, there was no scope for an appeal. The decision could not properly be characterised as perverse.
5. If evidence showed that conditions in the proposed camp had changed since the decisions, making return unsafe, that development could form the basis of a fresh asylum claim. It did not provide an arguable ground of appeal on the material before the court.

• Asylum and Immigration Tribunal: On reconsideration, upheld the adjudicator’s dismissal of the asylum and humanitarian relief appeal, relying on internal relocation.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Laws LJ had refused permission on paper. Lord Justice Tuckey refused the renewed application for an extension of time and permission to appeal.