Osei v London Borough of Southwark

Under Housing Act 1996, intentional homelessness requires deliberate conduct causing the applicant to cease occupying accommodation that was available and reasonable to continue occupying. Availability and reasonableness are assessed when occupation ceased, and accommodation must be considered for the applicant and family members who normally reside with him. A local authority must make appropriate inquiries, but a court interferes only where the authority’s inquiry or factual conclusion was irrational or one that no reasonable authority could have made. Overcrowding does not automatically make continued occupation unreasonable. The authority may consider local housing conditions and may conclude that it was reasonable to remain in former accommodation until secure alternative housing was arranged.

Mr Osei left a jointly rented, allegedly overcrowded flat in Madrid, moved to London for work, and later brought his wife and two children to London. After his temporary accommodation ended, Southwark decided under section 184 of the Housing Act 1996 that he was intentionally homeless because he had relinquished accommodation that was available and reasonable to continue occupying.

Southwark upheld that decision on review under section 202, including on the alternative basis that, even assuming overcrowding in Madrid, it was reasonable to remain there until better arrangements were secured. The Lambeth County Court dismissed Mr Osei’s appeal on a point of law. The central issue was whether Southwark had erred in law by failing to inquire adequately into overcrowding, reversing the burden of proof, or reaching an irrational conclusion on reasonableness.

1. Appeal dismissed. Southwark had an unassailable alternative ground for deciding that Mr Osei was intentionally homeless.
2. Section 191(1) of the Housing Act 1996 contains four requirements: deliberate conduct or omission; causation of cessation of occupation; accommodation available for occupation; and reasonableness of continuing to occupy it. The third and fourth requirements fall to be assessed when the applicant ceased to occupy the accommodation.
3. By section 176, availability had to be considered for Mr Osei together with his wife and children. The statutory question was whether continued occupation was reasonable, not whether it was the best arrangement. Overcrowding did not automatically answer that question.
4. The authority had to make appropriate inquiries under section 184 and determine the issue under the review procedure in section 202. The court would intervene only if the authority’s decision not to make further inquiries was irrational, or if its factual conclusion was one that no reasonable housing authority could have reached on the evidence.
5. Southwark was entitled to assume, without deciding, that the Madrid flat was overcrowded. It could nevertheless conclude that continued occupation was reasonable because the family had security of tenure there until at least June 2006, whereas the London accommodation was at least as overcrowded and lacked security of tenure. Section 177(2) permitted regard to the general housing circumstances in Southwark, including pressure on its housing resources.
6. The authorities concerning inadequate inquiries, including R (Bibi) v Tower Hamlets LBC and R (Duro-Rama) v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC, turned on their facts and did not establish that Southwark’s conclusion was irrational. The approach was consistent in effect with De Falco v Crawley Council, approved in R v Hillingdon Council ex p Islam. The appeal was therefore dismissed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal from the Lambeth County Court dismissed.
• Lambeth County Court: Mr Recorder Widdup dismissed Mr Osei’s appeal on a point of law on 5 January 2007.