Terry, Estate of v London Borough of Tower Hamlets

Where separate applications for permission to appeal arise from the same facts, and one issue necessarily depends on the outcome of the other, it is ordinarily sensible to hear them together. The court should weigh convenience, economy, possible confusion and claimed prejudice. A joint hearing may be directed where the objections do not disclose a real procedural unfairness, with case-management directions tailored to the distinct issues.

The estate of Peter Terrance Terry pursued two applications for permission to appeal concerning a council flat formerly rented by the deceased. Munby J held that the estate had no proprietary interest supporting a right to buy, dismissed the claim and discharged an injunction. Treacy J later discharged a second injunction. A separate price issue had been decided by Supperstone QC, and the Court of Appeal had upheld that decision, but it arose only if a right to buy existed. Lloyd LJ directed on paper that the two permission applications be considered together. The issue before Auld LJ was whether that direction should be reconsidered under CPR 52 16(6a).

Applications directed to be heard together. The court reconsidered Lloyd LJ’s paper direction under CPR 52 16(6a). Auld LJ did not determine either substantive right-to-buy issue.

1. The applications concerned distinct questions, but both arose from the same facts. The price question could arise only if the first application succeeded. The validity of the second injunction likewise depended on the outcome of the first issue. That interdependence made joint consideration sensible.
2. The objections based on possible confusion, prejudice, breach of natural justice, wasted expenditure and alleged exposure to negligence claims did not identify a persuasive procedural reason to separate the applications.
3. Convenience and economy favoured a single consideration, saving time and cost for the parties and the court.

The applications were therefore to be heard and considered together. A composite bundle covering both was to be prepared and submitted within a suggested fourteen days. Two skeleton arguments were required: one addressing the Munby decision and a short separate skeleton addressing the Treacy decision. The matter was expedited.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 20 September 2007, Auld LJ directed that the two permission applications be heard and considered together, with a composite bundle, separate skeleton arguments and expedition.
2. High Court, Queen’s Bench Division: Munby J held on 14 March 2006 that the estate had no proprietary interest supporting a right to buy, and dismissed the claim and discharged an injunction. Treacy J discharged a second injunction on 3 July 2006.
3. High Court, Queen’s Bench Division: Supperstone QC held on 2 and 15 December 2005 that the statutory notice entitled the applicant, if otherwise eligible, to the higher statutory price. The Court of Appeal had upheld that decision.