Donegan & Anor v Ghadami & Anor

On an application for summary judgment, the court may determine an estoppel claim on the assumption most favourable to the claimant’s opponent. Acts ordinarily expected during continuing negotiations for a joint venture do not, without more, constitute sufficient detrimental reliance for proprietary estoppel. Even if sufficient reliance is assumed, relief transferring valuable property will not be ordered where there is no realistic prospect that such relief would be appropriate. A party may apply for summary judgment after an earlier procedural election where later particulars materially clarify the case. Procedural objections not raised below may be too late on appeal.

The claimants, property developers and registered proprietors of St Leonard’s and an attached lodge, sought removal of unilateral notices registered by the defendants. The notices alleged proprietary estoppel and an agreement for sale. The defendants relied on an unsigned memorandum said to record a joint venture, and alleged that they had acted to their detriment by ceasing other negotiations and incurring professional expenses.

Briggs J granted summary judgment for the claimants. He accepted that whether there had been a sufficient promise was a triable issue, but held that the pleaded acts did not amount to sufficient detrimental reliance. He also held that transfer of the properties would not be an available remedy. The defendants renewed an application for permission to appeal and a stay before the Court of Appeal, principally challenging the estoppel conclusions and the fairness of the procedure.

1. Application refused. The Court of Appeal refused permission to appeal. Lord Justice Thomas gave the judgment, and Lord Justice Keene agreed. The order was therefore that the application be refused.
2. There was no realistic prospect of a different conclusion on detrimental reliance. The acts relied upon—ceasing negotiations with others, arranging meetings, and instructing commercial property professionals—were acts expected of an entrepreneur continuing to negotiate a proposed joint venture. They were referable to negotiations that had not been concluded by a signed agreement. The defendant’s later reference to the need for a written agreement was also inconsistent with the alleged reliance (paras 15–20).
3. Even assuming sufficient detrimental reliance, there was no prospect of an order transferring St Leonard’s and the lodge, or an interest in them, in satisfaction of the alleged promissory estoppel. Briggs J had relied on Ravensocean v Gardner (unreported) [19 January 2001], and the Court of Appeal saw no prospect of showing that conclusion to be wrong (paras 19, 21).
4. The claimants were entitled to apply for summary judgment after an earlier election for an expedited trial. The later particulars, served pursuant to Mann J’s order, set out the defence more fully and provided a proper basis for reconsidering summary judgment. An application expressed as one to strike out could be treated as an application for summary judgment where the substance was that the defence had no prospect of success. The defendant had in fact served evidence, and objections not made before Briggs J could not properly be raised for the first time on appeal (paras 22–24).
5. The procedural complaints did not disclose unfairness or irregularity. The papers showed that Briggs J understood the real issues, considered the defendant’s case on its most favourable footing, and gave a careful judgment. Under CPR Part 24, it was not necessary for him to resolve disputed issues which were accepted as triable where the pleaded case nevertheless failed on detrimental reliance and remedy (paras 25–30).

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 21 August 2007, the renewed application for permission to appeal and a stay was refused. The court found no realistic prospect of success and made the order: application refused.
2. High Court, Chancery Division: Briggs J granted summary judgment for the claimants on 13 June 2007, holding that the defence disclosed no reasonable prospect of success on detrimental reliance and the proposed remedy.
3. High Court, Chancery Division: Mann J had ordered an expedited trial and directed the defendants to provide particulars of the defence. The later particulars preceded the summary judgment application.