Ashton, R. v

A functioning part made specifically for, and necessary to the operation of, a prohibited automatic weapon may be a component part of that weapon for the purposes of the firearms prohibition. Whether an item is such a component part is a question of fact.

The statutory exception for a properly de-activated firearm is tightly confined. It permits possession or trade in the complete de-activated weapon, but does not extend to a component part removed from it. The component’s possible origin in a de-activated weapon therefore does not prevent it from falling within the prohibition.

Sentences for firearms offences must reflect the public-protection purpose of the legislation, including the particular risks arising from a serving soldier’s access to firearms.

The appellant, a serving soldier and weapons collector, offered for sale online the gas plug of a general purpose machine gun. He was charged before a General Court Martial with attempting to sell a prohibited weapon, contrary to section 70 of the Army Act.

At the close of the prosecution case, the Judge Advocate rejected the submission that the prosecution had to prove that the gas plug had not come from a de-activated weapon. The appellant then pleaded guilty and received six months’ military detention, suspended for one year, with reduction to the ranks.

He appealed against conviction and sentence. The central issue was whether a functioning gas plug could be a prohibited weapon component despite a possible origin in a de-activated firearm.

1. The appeals against conviction and sentence were dismissed.
2. The Judge Advocate had correctly directed the Board that whether the gas plug was a component part of a prohibited weapon under Firearms Act 1968, sections 5 and 57, was a question of fact. The expression had its ordinary and natural meaning. In this context, it covered a part manufactured specifically for a general purpose machine gun and without which that weapon could not function. The agreed evidence admitted of no realistic conclusion other than that the functioning gas plug met that description.
3. The exception in section 8 of the Firearms (Amendment) Act 1988 was deliberately narrow. It applied where a firearm remained complete, had been rendered incapable of discharge, bore the approved mark, and had the required certification. It did not exempt a component removed from such a firearm. Once a weapon is disassembled, its parts may be reassembled into a working weapon; the mischief addressed by section 57 therefore exists regardless of whether the component originated in a working or de-activated weapon.
4. The sentence was neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive. Firearms sentencing must give effect to the policy of preventing material capable of forming part of lethal weapons from becoming freely available. A serving soldier’s ready access to firearms was an additional public-policy consideration. The suspended minimum custodial sentence properly reflected both that policy and the appellant’s strong service record.

• Courts-Martial Appeal Court: dismissed the appellant’s appeals against conviction and sentence.
• General Court Martial at Bulford: following the Judge Advocate’s ruling at the close of the prosecution case, the appellant pleaded guilty to attempting to sell a prohibited weapon. He was sentenced to six months’ military detention, suspended for one year, and reduction to the ranks.