Massey, R. v

Under Sexual Offences Act 2003 s 53(1), control of prostitution-related activities is not confined to force, coercion or total domination. It is sufficient that a person intentionally directs or instructs another’s relevant activities for gain. The reason for compliance may include intimidation, emotional pressure, vulnerability, immaturity, promised gain or other forms of influence, but an absence of free will is not an element of the offence. The statutory context and explanatory material may assist in identifying the exploitation at which the provision is aimed.

The appellant was tried at Exeter Crown Court on four counts concerning Diane, with whom he had lived for about nine years. He was acquitted of rape and assault occasioning actual bodily harm, but convicted of living on prostitution under the Sexual Offences Act 1956 and of controlling prostitution for gain under the Sexual Offences Act 2003.

The prosecution alleged that he took her earnings and organised her prostitution through advertising, a website, appointments, a diary and transport. The appellant maintained that he sought to dissuade her from prostitution and only helped to make her activities safer. By agreement, the jury received a common direction based on the later statutory offence. The central issue on appeal was the meaning of control under s 53(1), and whether the direction rendered the convictions unsafe.

The appeal against conviction was dismissed. The application for leave to appeal against sentence was refused.

1. Section 53(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 had to be construed in its statutory setting and in light of the mischief of exploitation of prostitution for gain. The identical language in s 49(1), together with its explanatory note, supported the conclusion that intentionally requiring or directing particular prostitution-related conduct could amount to control.

2. Control was wider than compulsion. It did not require total domination, force, coercion, or proof that the prostitute lacked free will. It was enough that the defendant intentionally instructed or directed relevant activities. Compliance might result from violence, threats, emotional blackmail, a dominant personality, vulnerability, immaturity, the prospect of gain, or other influences.

3. The trial judge had therefore put the requirement too high by describing control as requiring compulsion. Read as a whole, however, the direction could not have caused the jury to underestimate the prosecution burden. The evidence of the diary, website and the appellant’s role in organising and profiting from the activities provided an ample basis for the convictions if the jury accepted Diane’s general account. The acquittals on the separate allegations of rape and assault did not make the convictions unsafe.

4. The concurrent four-year sentence for the s 53 offence was neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive. The offending involved prolonged financial exploitation of a vulnerable woman, with an ever-present threat of violence. The later-issued sentencing guideline did not justify interference.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Leave to appeal against conviction was granted, but the conviction appeal was dismissed. The application for leave to appeal against sentence was refused.
• Exeter Crown Court: The appellant was acquitted of rape and assault occasioning actual bodily harm, and convicted of living on prostitution and controlling prostitution for gain. He received concurrent sentences of 18 months’ and four years’ imprisonment.