Scott, R. v

A person released on bail must surrender at the exact time and place appointed. Bail Act 1976 section 6(1) permits a defence of reasonable cause, but it contains no implied de minimis allowance for lateness. A short delay alone therefore does not prevent liability.

The court has a discretion whether to require a failure-to-surrender allegation to be put. That discretion is reviewable on Wednesbury principles. Only a truly marginal delay could make pursuit unreasonable, and such cases will be rare. The disruption of court business and the relevance of the incident to future bail decisions are proper considerations.

The appellant was on bail to attend Snaresbrook Crown Court at 10.00 am for a plea and case management hearing on firearm and drugs charges. He arrived more than 30 minutes late because he had overslept. The judge required an allegation of failure to surrender to be put to him. He pleaded guilty, and received no separate penalty for that offence.

He appealed because the conviction remained on his record. He contended that the delay was de minimis and that, in any event, the judge acted unreasonably in requiring the allegation to be put.

1. Appeal dismissed. The appellant failed to surrender to custody when he did not attend at the appointed time. Section 6(1) of the Bail Act 1976 makes such a failure an offence unless there is reasonable cause. Read with section 2(2), it requires surrender at the appointed time and place.

2. The statutory language admits no implied allowance for attendance at or about the appointed time. A general criminal-law de minimis principle cannot create a defence whenever a statutory limit is exceeded only slightly. The court considered that R v Gateshead Justice ex parte Usher [1981] Crim LR 491 DC, reported only briefly and affected by several irregularities, should not be treated as establishing a general principle that marginal lateness is not an offence.

3. The court nevertheless accepted that the decision whether to put an established failure-to-surrender allegation is discretionary. A truly marginal late arrival might, exceptionally, make it Wednesbury unreasonable to pursue the matter. That would be rare.

4. The judge had acted reasonably. A delay of more than 30 minutes, caused by oversleeping, was materially different from a seven-minute delay. Courts may take account of the disruption, wasted time and wider effect on the administration of justice caused by late attendance. It was also legitimate to ensure that the failure appeared on the appellant's record for consideration in future bail decisions. Mitigating circumstances might affect sentence, but did not make the decision to put the allegation unreasonable.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): dismissed the appeal against the decision to require a failure-to-surrender allegation to be put.
• Snaresbrook Crown Court: the judge required the allegation to be put after the appellant arrived more than 30 minutes late. The appellant pleaded guilty and received no separate penalty for that offence.