Jan, R. v

A discretionary life sentence requires offences sufficiently grave to warrant a very long sentence and good grounds for believing that the offender will remain a serious danger to the public for a period that cannot reliably be estimated. The sentencing court must assess those matters on all the evidence, including but not confined to psychiatric evidence. Such a sentence remains exceptional. Where it is imposed, the court should ordinarily set the minimum period to be served before parole consideration under the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000.

The appellant was convicted at the Crown Court at Middlesex Guildhall of public nuisance and two counts of arson with intent to endanger life. He received concurrent discretionary life sentences without a minimum term.

His separate appeal against conviction had already been dismissed by the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): [2006] EWCA Crim 2314. On this sentence appeal, he challenged the refusal of an adjournment for further psychiatric evidence, the principle of discretionary life sentences, and the omission of a minimum term.

The central issues were whether the offences and continuing risk justified life sentences, and what minimum term should be imposed.

1. Appeal allowed to a limited extent. The court upheld the concurrent discretionary life sentences. It allowed the appeal only because the sentencing judge should have fixed a minimum term before parole consideration.
2. Applying the principles in R v Hodgson (1967) 52 Cr App R (S) 113, as explained in later authority, a discretionary life sentence required offences grave enough to call for a very long sentence and good grounds for believing that the offender would remain a serious danger to the public for an unascertainable period. Psychiatric evidence was often highly relevant, but the decisive question was the assessment on all the facts. Such sentences were exceptional.
3. The first requirement was met. The arsons formed the culmination of a prolonged, deliberate and highly damaging campaign of threats, harassment, violence and property damage. The arsons created a real risk to life. Taken together, the offences were sufficiently serious and exceptional to warrant a very long sentence.
4. The court was unable to conclude that the risk would be absent or low in the future. Although the medical evidence differed as to diagnosis and prognosis, both experts considered that further treatment was required. The duration and gravity of the campaign, the appellant’s conduct, and the absence of reassurance in his later statements established a serious danger to the public for a period that could not be predicted. The life sentences were therefore justified.
5. Under section 82 A of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, the court fixed a minimum term of seven and a half years on each count, less 519 days, or such number of remand days as proved correct. Expiry of that term made the appellant eligible for consideration by the Parole Board; it did not require his release.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Allowed the sentence appeal only to impose a minimum term, while upholding the discretionary life sentences.
2. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Dismissed the separate conviction appeal: [2006] EWCA Crim 2314.
3. Crown Court at Middlesex Guildhall Convicted the appellant of public nuisance and two counts of arson with intent to endanger life, and imposed concurrent life sentences without a minimum term.