Pearson-Gaballonie, R v

A trial judge may direct that a trial proceed in a defendant’s absence where repeated adjournments and the circumstances of the absence justify the conclusion that the defendant has deliberately prevented attendance and would do so again if the trial were adjourned. The exercise of that discretion will not render a conviction unsafe where the defendant was represented, had given instructions to legal representatives, and the jury was directed not to speculate about the absence or draw an adverse inference.

A severe sentence for sustained, degrading and violent mistreatment of a vulnerable and dependent victim is not manifestly excessive where it properly reflects the gravity of the offending and available mitigation.

Antonia Pearson-Gaballonie renewed applications for leave to appeal against convictions for assault occasioning actual bodily harm, false imprisonment and threatening to kill, and against a total sentence of seven years’ imprisonment. Her co-defendant, Neil Edward Pearson, renewed an application for leave to appeal against his conviction for aiding and abetting assault occasioning actual bodily harm.

The trial had proceeded in Pearson-Gaballonie’s absence following an apparent suicide attempt. There had been repeated earlier adjournments, including one arising from self-induced drug-taking. The trial judge concluded that she was deliberately avoiding trial and that a further adjournment would lead to repetition. The central issue was whether the resulting convictions were unsafe and whether the sentence was excessive.

1. All renewed applications for leave to appeal were refused.

2. The court endorsed the Single Judge’s conclusion that the trial judge was entitled to find, from the repeated adjournments and their causes, that Pearson-Gaballonie had deliberately prevented herself from standing trial. The judge was also entitled to conclude that a further adjournment would probably lead to another attempt to avoid trial.

3. The discretion to continue in her absence had been properly exercised. She was represented, had provided instructions to her legal representatives, and the judge directed the jury neither to speculate about her absence nor to draw an adverse inference from it. No basis was advanced for finding that the discretion had been exercised wrongly, and the convictions were therefore not unsafe.

4. The total sentence of seven years for Pearson-Gaballonie was neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive. The offending involved sustained, systematic and degrading cruelty towards a vulnerable woman dependent on her. The sentence properly reflected the seriousness of the offences after allowing for available mitigation.

5. Pearson’s prospects of challenging his conviction depended on the success of Pearson-Gaballonie’s application. As her renewed applications failed, his application also failed.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Renewed applications for leave to appeal against conviction and, for Pearson-Gaballonie, sentence, following refusal by the Single Judge. All applications were refused.
• Crown Court: Pearson-Gaballonie was convicted of offences including assault occasioning actual bodily harm, false imprisonment and threatening to kill, and received a total sentence of seven years’ imprisonment. Pearson was convicted of aiding and abetting assault occasioning actual bodily harm and received two years’ imprisonment.