Reynolds & Ors, R. v

Criminal Justice Act 2003 Part 12, Chapter 5 establishes a mandatory sentencing sequence for dangerous offenders. The court must first identify whether the offence is specified and serious, then decide whether the statutory dangerousness criteria are met, before selecting the prescribed sentence.

A Crown Court may use the slip rule to rescind a sentence within 28 days and may then adjourn final sentence under its common-law jurisdiction. On an offender’s appeal, however, section 11(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 prevents the Court of Appeal from substituting a more severe mandatory sentence. A sentence passed contrary to the Chapter 5 scheme remains effective unless varied or quashed.

Eight appeals and applications against sentence were heard together. They arose from sentences imposed in several Crown Courts for sexual, violent, robbery and child-cruelty offences.

The principal common issue was the consequence of a sentencing judge’s mistake when applying the dangerous-offender provisions in Chapter 5 of Part 12 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The court also considered the Crown Court’s power to correct and adjourn sentence under section 155 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, and the statutory restriction on increasing a sentence on an offender’s appeal.

1. The court held that Chapter 5 of Part 12 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 is a mandatory and discrete code. Once an offender is convicted of a specified offence and meets the dangerousness criteria, the statutory classification of the offence and the offender’s age determine the available sentence. An adult convicted of a serious offence must receive an indeterminate sentence; an adult convicted of a specified but non-serious offence must receive an extended sentence.

2. The Crown Court may, under section 155 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, rescind a sentence within 28 days. Rescission restores the offender to the position of a convicted but unsentenced defendant. Following R v Annesley [1975] 62 Cr App R 113, the court may then adjourn final sentence where justice requires. The court therefore declined to follow the contrary approach in R v Stillwell and Jewell (1992) 94 Cr App R 65.

3. Section 11(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 nevertheless barred the Court of Appeal, on an offender’s appeal, from replacing a determinate or extended sentence with the more severe mandatory indeterminate sentence. That restriction prevailed even where the Crown Court had misapplied Chapter 5. As explained in R v Cain [1985] 1 AC 46, the original Crown Court sentence remained effective unless varied or quashed. Where dangerousness had properly been found, the court would ordinarily preserve that finding and the sentence actually imposed so far as possible.

4. A Sexual Offences Prevention Order and the Chapter 5 public-protection regime are distinct but may both be imposed where justified. The order in Reynolds was varied because one internet-access prohibition was too wide.

5. The court allowed or varied the appeals in Reynolds, Lubwama, Webb, Honore, Slaney and S. It substituted determinate sentences where dangerousness had not been soundly established, quashed unlawful extension periods, and corrected the form of extended sentences without increasing overall severity. Downing’s application was refused and Thompson’s application was dismissed.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Eight sentencing appeals or applications were determined together. The court varied or quashed aspects of six sentences, refused Downing’s application and dismissed Thompson’s application.
• Crown Court: The underlying sentences had been imposed at Exeter, Southwark, Luton, Ipswich, Northampton, Nottingham, the Central Criminal Court and other Crown Courts. No lower-court neutral citations were stated.