G v Burnley Magistrates Court

In deciding whether a child or young person should be committed to the Crown Court for a grave crime, the youth court must apply the statutory sentencing test and the strong policy favouring trial in the youth court. The decision is one of venue, not sentence, and the reviewing court allows a margin for reasonable judgment at the borderline. Judicial review succeeds where the committal decision is manifestly wrong, irrational or unlawful. Relevant considerations include the offender’s age at the time of the offence, character, the seriousness and circumstances of the conduct, and the realistic prospect of detention of two years or more. A short incident involving 13- or 14-year-olds of good character may not justify Crown Court committal, even where the conduct is reprehensible.

The claimant and four interested parties, all aged 13 or 14 when the alleged sexual offences occurred, challenged the Burnley Youth Court’s decision of 17 November 2006. The magistrates had substituted charges under section 13 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and concluded that the offences were grave crimes under section 24 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980. They committed the defendants to the Crown Court for trial and sentence, applying the guidance in H, A and O v Southampton Youth Court (Southampton No 2) [2004] EWHC 2912 (Admin). The central issue was whether that decision was manifestly wrong.

1. The court applied the established judicial-review question: whether the youth court’s determination was wrong in law, irrational or manifestly wrong. The decision under review concerned venue rather than sentence, and the statutory framework allowed a reasonable range of outcomes at the borderline. See C and others v Croydon Youth Court and Central Herts Youth Court [2006] EWHC 2627.
2. The youth court had correctly directed itself by reference to the guidance collected in H, A and O v Southampton Youth Court (Southampton No 2) [2004] EWHC 2912 (Admin). The policy was that persons under 18, particularly those under 15, should ordinarily be tried in the youth court, with Crown Court trial reserved for the most serious cases. The court had to consider whether, having regard to the defendant’s age, there was a real prospect that detention of two years or more would be required.
3. The statutory position had changed because section 13 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 was a scheduled offence under section 91 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, as amended by paragraph 43 of Schedule 6 to the 2003 Act. The Crown Court therefore had power to impose detention of up to five years, whereas the magistrates’ maximum power was six months.
4. Despite that power, the committal decision was manifestly wrong. The alleged conduct was unpleasant and serious, but the incident was short, the defendants were of good character, and each was 13 or 14 at the time. Apart from the alleged insertion of the vibrator, there was no real possibility of detention exceeding two years. The maximum sentence of five years did not make such a sentence realistic on these facts.
5. The committals were quashed for the claimant and all four interested parties. If, after hearing the evidence, the magistrates considered their sentencing powers insufficient, they could then commit any defendant to the Crown Court for sentence. Costs were ordered to be paid out of central funds on detailed assessment.

The claimant sought judicial review of the Burnley Youth Court’s decision of 17 November 2006. The Divisional Court held that the decision was manifestly wrong and quashed the committals for the claimant and the four interested parties.