Independent Police Complaints Commission, R (on the application of) v Chief Constable of West Mercia & Ors

A disciplinary tribunal may consider conduct previously examined at an inquest. An inquest is inquisitorial, and its verdict does not determine criminal or civil liability or exonerate a police officer from disciplinary responsibility. A stay for abuse of process is exceptional. It may be required where continuing proceedings would be manifestly unfair or would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, including through a collateral attack on a decision of a competent tribunal. Those principles were not engaged merely because the disciplinary charges substantially overlapped with questions answered by an inquest jury, particularly where the disciplinary proceedings were adversarial, the evidence might differ, and relevant parties had not been represented at the inquest.

The Independent Police Complaints Commission directed the Chief Constable of West Mercia to bring disciplinary proceedings against PC David Walton following the death of Robert Hall during or after his arrest. An inquest jury found that the force used during the arrest was reasonable, but that appropriate action had not been taken by custody staff.

The disciplinary panel stayed proceedings as an abuse of process, considering that the charges substantially raised matters already determined by the inquest on essentially the same facts and arguments. The Commission sought judicial review of that decision. The central issue was whether the overlap between the inquest and disciplinary proceedings required the disciplinary proceedings to be stayed.

1. The claim succeeded. The decision of the disciplinary panel to stay the proceedings as an abuse of process was quashed. The disciplinary panel, or any fresh panel appointed by the Chief Constable, was ordered to hear and determine the disciplinary charges.

2. The power to stay proceedings for abuse of process must be exercised with the greatest caution. It may arise where continuation would be manifestly unfair to a party or would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. A collateral attack on a final decision of a competent tribunal is an example of the latter category.

3. The inquest could not determine whether PC Walton had breached the disciplinary Code of Conduct. Its inquisitorial character meant that the jury’s findings did not bind affected persons. Rule 42 of the Coroners Rules 1984 also prevented the verdict from determining criminal or civil liability. PC Walton therefore had not been legally exonerated from disciplinary responsibility.

4. The disciplinary proceedings were materially different from the inquest. They were adversarial, the presenting officer bore the burden of proof, and the evidence might not be identical because witnesses could give different evidence and the panel could apply evidential discretions differently. The Commission and Mr Hall’s family had not been represented at the inquest, so PC Walton’s account had not necessarily been tested as it would be in disciplinary proceedings.

5. Redgrave was of limited assistance because it concerned double jeopardy, not abuse of process. The court nevertheless accepted that the absence of identical parties did not prevent an abuse-of-process argument: relitigation may be abusive where it would be manifestly unfair or bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The panel was not under a duty to stay the proceedings on the basis it adopted.

6. PC Walton remained entitled to argue before the panel that continuation would be manifestly unfair. The panel would need to consider that the inquest verdict did not exonerate him, the evidence would not necessarily be exactly the same, and the inquest questioning was unlikely to have tested his account in the same manner. PC Walton was ordered to pay the Commission’s costs, summarily assessed at £4,860.40, subject to any application concerning costs.