Neptune Wharf Ltd & Anor, R (on the application of) v The London Development Agency

Section 13C(5) of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981 does not require a confirming authority to specify a fixed calendar date when postponing consideration of part of a compulsory purchase order. “Time” may refer to the occurrence of an event or to a mechanism by which the time is determined. The provision is intended to manage uncertainty, including uncertainty about planning permission and the duration of the planning process.

A post-enactment circular is not ordinarily an authoritative guide to statutory interpretation. Parliamentary material is admissible under Pepper v Hart only where the statutory wording is ambiguous, obscure or leads to absurdity, and the ministerial statement is clear. Procedural fairness is fact-sensitive; prior consultation is not invariably required where an affected party has a meaningful opportunity to make representations after the direction.

The claimants owned and occupied land included in a compulsory purchase order made by the London Development Agency to facilitate the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games and related legacy facilities. Their land was intended as a possible relocation site for a bus depot, but planning permission had not been obtained.

Following a public inquiry, the Inspector recommended deferring consideration of the relevant plots under section 13C of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981 until the planning position became clear. The Secretary of State adopted that recommendation and directed that consideration be postponed until notified of the planning outcome or an earlier time he considered appropriate.

The claimants challenged the direction on three grounds: statutory interpretation, failure to follow policy, and breach of natural justice.

1. The claim was dismissed. Ground 2 was refused permission, while the substantive challenges under grounds 1 and 3 were dismissed.
2. Section 13C(5) of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981 requires postponement until a time specified by or under the direction. It does not require a fixed date. The word “time” is capable of referring to the happening of an event, and “by or under” permits either a date in the direction or a mechanism by which the time will be determined.
3. The statutory purpose supported that construction. Section 13C permits staged confirmation where the authority is satisfied that part of an order should be confirmed but uncertainty prevents determination of the remainder. Planning permission and the likely duration of the planning process are examples of such uncertainty. Requiring a fixed date could compel the authority to predict an appropriate date when that prediction was inherently difficult.
4. The relevant passages in Circular 06/2004 were no more than a shorthand exposition of the statutory power and did not amount to an authoritative interpretation or binding policy. The claimants therefore could not establish unlawfulness merely because the direction did not specify a fixed deadline. In any event, a Minister may depart from policy provided the circumstances ordinarily call for an explanation, and the reason for the mechanism adopted here was apparent.
5. Applying the principles in Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593, the Parliamentary material was inadmissible. Section 13C(5) was neither ambiguous nor obscure and did not produce absurdity. The Minister’s reference to a fixed date was clear, but the statement that the date would be specified in or following the direction was not sufficiently clear.
6. Fairness depends on all the circumstances. Neither the Act nor the circular required prior consultation with affected landowners. The claimants had an opportunity, after service of the direction, to make representations that the order should be determined immediately or within a proposed timescale. In those circumstances, issuing the direction without prior notice was not unfair or contrary to natural justice.