Hussey v Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty To Animals

For an offence under section 1(1)(a) of the Protection of Animals Act 1911, whether conduct is unreasonable is ordinarily assessed objectively. The relevant standard may be that of the ordinary reasonably competent, reasonably humane and modern owner. The prosecution must nevertheless establish the defendant’s requisite knowledge of the animal’s condition and, where required, the relevant suffering or risk of suffering. A conviction may stand where the magistrates’ findings establish the necessary knowledge and foresight, even if the court leaves the precise mental element unresolved. The charge need not allege failure to obtain veterinary advice where the substantive allegation is failure to provide an adequate diet causing unnecessary suffering.

This was an appeal by case stated from the conviction of Hussey v Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty To Animals at Milton Keynes Magistrates’ Court. The appellant was convicted under section 1(1)(a) of the Protection of Animals Act 1911 for unreasonably omitting to provide an underweight German shepherd-type dog with an adequate diet suitable for its breed, age and condition.

The magistrates found that the appellant knew of the dog’s substantial weight loss, failed to obtain veterinary advice, and thereby caused unnecessary suffering. The appeal raised issues concerning mens rea, the objective meaning of unreasonable conduct, the adequacy of the information, Article 6 of the Convention, causation, and the possible relevance of small intestinal bacterial overgrowth.

1. Appeal dismissed. The magistrates’ findings were sufficient to establish the offence under section 1(1)(a) of the Protection of Animals Act 1911.
2. The word “unreasonably” ordinarily connotes an objective test. The standard identified in Hall & Hall v Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals was that of the ordinary reasonably competent, reasonably humane and modern owner. Lord Justice Latham agreed that the subsequent assessment would ordinarily be objective.
3. The court expressed reservations about the extent to which Peterssen v Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals supplied the appropriate solution in this type of case. It was unnecessary to decide conclusively whether the prosecution had to prove knowledge that the animal’s condition would or might cause suffering. On either approach, the magistrates had found that the appellant knew of the dog’s substantial weight loss and that the necessary knowledge and foresight were present.
4. The information was properly framed. Its substance was the failure to provide an adequate diet suitable for the dog’s breed, age and condition, causing unnecessary suffering. It did not need to allege separately that the appellant had failed to obtain veterinary advice. The possible presence of small intestinal bacterial overgrowth was irrelevant because there was no finding that the appellant knew or ought to have known of it.
5. The complaint that the magistrates had failed to address causation was rejected. The appeal was dismissed and the costs were ordered to be taxed out of central funds.

1. High Court (Administrative Court): appeal by case stated dismissed.
2. Milton Keynes Magistrates’ Court: conviction on 3 July 2006 under section 1(1)(a) of the Protection of Animals Act 1911; fine, costs, disqualification from custody of a dog and deprivation order.