Culley, R (on the application of) v Crown Court Sitting At Dorchester

Under section 7 of the Bail Act 1976, a person arrested for breach of bail must have the matter resolved within 24 hours of arrest, subject only to the statutory exceptions. It is insufficient that the person is brought before a justice within that period if the hearing and decision continue beyond it. Once the period expires, the justice has no jurisdiction to continue dealing with the alleged breach or to remand the person in custody. Any subsequent order is ultra vires and unlawful. A decision may nevertheless contain sustainable factual findings about the breach, but those findings cannot validate an order made outside the statutory time limit.

The claimant was arrested under section 7 of the Bail Act 1976 for allegedly breaching curfew and residence conditions. He was brought before the Crown Court, where the judge initially adjourned the matter overnight to receive further evidence. On the following day, after more than 24 hours had elapsed, the judge found a breach of curfew and remanded the claimant in custody pending trial. The claimant sought judicial review, arguing that section 7(4) required the entire matter to be determined within 24 hours and that the judge thereafter had no jurisdiction.

1. The application for judicial review succeeded and the order remanding the claimant in custody was quashed.
2. Section 7(4) of the Bail Act 1976 imposed an absolute 24-hour limit. The claimant had to be brought before a justice within that period, and the proceedings under section 7(4) and section 7(5) had to be completed within it. The court relied on R v Governor of Glen Parva Young Offender Institution, ex parte G (A Minor) and treated the 24-hour requirement as absolute.
3. R (Hussain) v Derby Magistrates’ Court supported the conclusion that the whole matter had to be dealt with within the requisite period, even where a fresh judge could begin dealing with the matter after it had been put back in the list.
4. The decision in R v Liverpool City Justices, ex parte Director of Public Prosecutions was conclusive on the critical point. A justice had no power to adjourn proceedings under section 7(5). The arrested person had to have the matter resolved within 24 hours, and the prosecution had to provide sufficient material within that period.
5. After 24 hours had elapsed, Judge Beashel no longer had jurisdiction. Everything done thereafter was without power, ultra vires and unlawful. The fact that he might have reached the same conclusion had the evidence been available earlier could not cure the jurisdictional defect.
6. The judge’s factual findings were not irrational or perverse. He was entitled to infer from the claimant’s failure to answer the door on two occasions that he had breached his curfew. That issue did not need to be finally determined because the remand order was already unlawful.
7. The existing bail conditions continued to apply following the quashing of the remand order.

The judgment was a first-instance judicial review of the decision made by His Honour Judge Beashel on 25 August 2006 to remand the claimant in custody. The Administrative Court quashed that decision.