Niziol, R (on the application of) v City of Westminster

Under section 25 of the Extradition Act 2003, extradition is barred only where the person’s physical or mental condition makes extradition unjust or oppressive. A health risk, even a serious one, does not automatically satisfy that threshold. The court may properly rely on expert evidence while treating evidence expressed in dramatic or insufficiently supported terms with caution.

An adjournment may be refused where proceedings have already been substantially delayed, the evidence could reasonably have been obtained earlier, and the proposed material could not establish a statutory bar to extradition. Extradition proceedings do not engage Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights; Article 6 applies to subsequent criminal proceedings in the requesting state.

The claimant challenged a Deputy Senior District Judge’s decision that his physical and mental condition did not make extradition unjust or oppressive under section 25 of the Extradition Act 2003. He also appealed under section 26 against an order extraditing him to Poland.

The claimant argued that the health evidence had been inadequately assessed, that the refusal of an adjournment denied him a fair hearing, that one charge was not an extradition offence, and that the European arrest warrant scheme was incompatible with Article 6. The proceedings had already been delayed substantially, including because of the claimant’s health.

1. Renewed judicial review. The application was dismissed. The Deputy Senior District Judge had accepted that the claimant suffered from depressive illness but was entitled to conclude that it was insufficiently severe to make extradition unjust or oppressive. She had also considered the evidence concerning labile and potentially dangerous blood pressure. Her caution about the medical evidence was justified, and her reasons were adequate.
2. Even if the medical evidence were approached without that caution, there was insufficient evidence to establish the statutory threshold under section 25 of the Extradition Act 2003. The existence of a health risk does not mean that extradition must be refused whenever some risk is shown.
3. Appeal against extradition order. The appeal was dismissed. The earlier decision on section 25 did not infect the extradition order. Refusal of an adjournment was justified by the extensive delay, the absence of an adequate explanation for failing to obtain the evidence earlier, and the fact that the proposed material could not establish a bar under section 11 or section 13 of the Extradition Act 2003.
4. The allegation that the prosecution was brought in bad faith to conceal corruption did not suggest that the prosecution was intended to punish or discriminate against the claimant on any of the grounds identified in section 13.
5. The challenge to the certificate under section 63 was rejected. Even if charge 4 was not a framework-list offence, the facts stated were sufficient to indicate conduct capable of amounting to an offence under English domestic law.
6. The Article 6 challenge failed. Extradition proceedings do not engage Article 6; that provision would apply to criminal proceedings faced by the claimant after return to Poland. The incompatibility issue was also raised without the required notification to the relevant government department.
7. Costs were ordered in principle under section 60 of the Extradition Act 2003, with the amount to be agreed or assessed. Leave to appeal in relation to the judicial review was refused.

1. High Court (Administrative Court): dismissed the renewed judicial review application and the appeal under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003.
2. Single judge: permission to proceed with the judicial review had previously been refused by Sir Michael Harrison.
3. District Judge: rejected the section 25 health challenge on 1 December 2006, refused an adjournment on 5 March, and ordered extradition to Poland.