General Medical Council v Uruakpa

The court may preserve public protection while adjourning an application to extend an interim medical registration order. The proper course is ordinarily to extend the existing order for an appropriate interim period and adjourn the application for the balance of the period sought. Where an extension application was made before expiry, the court retains jurisdiction to extend the order retrospectively, even if an earlier order mistakenly replaced the interim order with conditions imposed by the court. Extensions remain genuinely interim. Delay, the doctor’s livelihood and the need for a prompt fitness-to-practise hearing must be balanced against public protection.

The General Medical Council sought a further 12-month extension of conditions imposed on Dr Uruakpa’s registration by an Interim Orders Panel under the Medical Act 1983. An earlier adjournment order had imposed equivalent conditions as an order of the court, creating uncertainty about whether the original interim order remained in force and whether the court retained jurisdiction to extend it.

The court considered the effect of the relevant statutory powers, the court’s general interlocutory jurisdiction and the delay in progressing the fitness-to-practise allegations. The central issues were whether the court could extend the order retrospectively and, if so, for what period.

1. Jurisdiction and proper procedure. The court has a general power, when adjourning a case, to impose appropriate conditions to protect the position pending the resumed hearing. Such an order may be analogous to an interim injunction. However, under section 41A of the Medical Act 1983, the preferable course is to extend the existing interim order for an appropriate period and adjourn the application for any remaining period sought. This preserves the court’s power to extend or vary the order under section 41A(10).
2. Retrospective extension. Although the earlier order was drafted inconsistently and was intended to operate as a separate court order, the court retained jurisdiction to extend the interim order retrospectively. The application for extension had been made before the original order expired. It would be unreasonable to deprive the court of jurisdiction merely because the earlier judge had adopted a less satisfactory procedural route. The approach in R v Sheerin (1977) 64 Cr App R 68, and as approved in Fehily v Governor of Wandsworth Prison [2003] 1 Cr App R 10, supported the existence of a power to extend time after expiry where the statutory language did not prohibit it.
3. Limits on further extension. The requested 12-month extension was disproportionate in the circumstances. Interim orders are imposed on material that has not yet been fully refuted, and prolonged restrictions may seriously affect a doctor’s livelihood and professional skills. Public protection remained important, but the GMC’s delay in obtaining and particularising the evidence weighed heavily against a lengthy extension. A further six-month extension was therefore granted, backdated to 28 January 2007 and expiring on 27 July 2007.
4. The GMC was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs, subject to detailed assessment if not agreed.