Sole v Secretary of State for Trade & Industry & Ors

A compulsory purchase decision which substantially interferes with Article 8 rights may nevertheless be proportionate where the acquisition serves an exceptionally important public project, the public benefits are substantial, no alternative means can achieve them, and a fair balance has been struck. The decision-maker need not adopt the least intrusive measure, provided the measure is reasonably necessary. The court must assess the inspector’s report and decision letter as a whole and should not isolate individual sentences from their context. Where an effective relocation process is already operating, it may be unnecessary to defer confirmation of a compulsory purchase order pending approval of a further relocation strategy.

The claimant lived on the Clays Lane Estate, which was required for the Olympic Athletes’ Village and related facilities. The London Development Agency made a compulsory purchase order under the Regional Development Agencies Act 1998. The Secretary of State confirmed it after adopting the inspector’s report.

The claimant challenged the order under section 23 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981. He alleged that the inspector had misunderstood the protection afforded by a Grampian planning condition and that confirmation of the order disproportionately interfered with his Article 8 right to respect for his home. He sought quashing or deferral of the order in respect of the estate under section 13C of the 1981 Act.

1. Grampian condition. The inspector understood that the planning condition required approval of a relocation strategy before development could commence. His reference to fulfilment of the condition concerned submission of the strategy, not its approval. There had been no breach because development had not commenced. The inspector was entitled to conclude that the absence of an approved strategy was of limited importance and that an effective relocation process was already underway.
2. The inspector therefore did not need to replicate the protection or leverage supplied by the Grampian condition by making confirmation of the compulsory purchase order conditional on a relocation strategy. The first ground of challenge failed.
3. Article 8 and proportionality. The claimant’s Article 8 rights were engaged and the Secretary of State had to justify the interference. The relevant exercise involved balancing the individual’s rights against the public interest. It was not necessary, on the submissions made, to decide whether proportionality invariably required the least intrusive measure. Even applying the claimant’s formulation that all reasonably necessary steps should be taken to minimise the interference, deferral was unnecessary because an effective relocation process was already in place.
4. The inspector’s report, read as a whole, dealt with affordability, the quality of replacement accommodation, homelessness, community loss, relocation choices and the pressure created by the order. The isolated criticisms advanced by the claimant did not establish an unbalanced approach. The public benefits of the Olympic and Legacy project were exceptionally important, the project was urgent, and there was no alternative means of securing those benefits. Confirmation of the order struck a fair balance and was proportionate.
5. The court did not decide the disputed construction of section 13C. On the facts, deferral would have been inappropriate because of the timing requirements and the uncertainty it would create for the wider project.
6. The claim was dismissed. The claimant was ordered to pay the first defendant’s costs, subject to the usual restriction for a community-funded applicant. Permission to appeal was refused. Any application to the Court of Appeal was to be made within 14 days.

First-instance judicial review claim under section 23 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981. The court refused permission to appeal, directing that any application to the Court of Appeal be made within 14 days.