Brown v HM Queen Elizabeth The Queen Mother, The Executors of the Estate of & Ors

Section 124 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 does not confer an unfettered right to inspect every will deposited with the High Court. The right remains subject to the court’s control and to rule 58 of the Non-Contentious Probate Rules 1987, which permits inspection to be refused where it would be undesirable or inappropriate.

After a will has been sealed, a subsequent applicant must show a substantial private interest, prospective claim, or prejudice capable of making inspection desirable or appropriate. A genuinely held but objectively baseless belief does not establish such an interest. A private litigant cannot ordinarily assert the general public interest where the Attorney General is the proper representative. Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention do not create a right to inspect documents in order to pursue an imaginary family relationship.

The plaintiff applied to inspect or unseal the wills of the late Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother and Princess Margaret. The wills had been sealed by orders of the former President of the Family Division, with provision that they could be opened only with the consent of the President.

The plaintiff claimed a personal interest because he believed that he was Princess Margaret’s illegitimate child. He also asserted a general public interest in inspection under section 124 of the Supreme Court Act 1981, and relied on Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention. The executors applied to strike out the claim as vexatious and an abuse of process. The central issues were the effect of the sealing orders, the interest required to seek later inspection, and whether the plaintiff’s evidence disclosed a legally sufficient interest.

1. Strike-out and effect of sealing orders. The claim was struck out as vexatious and an abuse of process under Order 18 rule 19 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1965 and under the inherent jurisdiction. The plaintiff’s evidence provided no rational basis for his belief that he was Princess Margaret’s child.
2. Inspection of wills. Section 124 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 creates a statutory presumption of openness, but expressly subjects inspection to the control of the High Court and probate rules. Rule 58 of the Non-Contentious Probate Rules 1987 permits inspection to be refused where it would be undesirable or otherwise inappropriate.
3. The sealing orders were public-law decisions affecting the public generally. The privacy interests of beneficiaries and other interested persons had to be balanced against the statutory presumption of openness. The Attorney General was appropriately joined to represent the public interest.
4. A proviso allowing later inspection on the President’s direction was appropriate because a person whose private rights or interests were adversely affected might not have had an opportunity to be heard when the sealing order was made. The later applicant bears the burden of establishing such an interest or substantial prejudice by affidavit evidence.
5. The plaintiff’s good-faith belief was insufficient. His asserted personal interest was founded on fantasy rather than fact and could not justify inspection. He also could not pursue the general public interest: the principles discussed in Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers and IRC v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd did not assist him.
6. Article 8 protects real private and family life, not an imaginary relationship with strangers. Article 10 does not confer a general right of access to information held by public bodies. The authorities relied upon by the plaintiff therefore did not support his application.