Attorney General v Miles & Anor

For a Civil Proceedings Order under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981, the court assesses the litigant’s conduct across the proceedings as a whole. Proceedings may be vexatious where they are repeatedly pursued without reasonable grounds, misuse court processes, impose disproportionate costs, or involve persistent repetition of an underlying grievance. The fact that claims are brought against different defendants, or take different procedural forms, does not prevent the statutory requirements being met.

The court may make an indefinite order against each litigant where there is an urgent need to prevent further proceedings. The order restricts the institution or continuation of civil proceedings without permission, but does not remove the statutory right to seek leave from a High Court judge.

The Attorney General applied under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 for Civil Proceedings Orders against John and Bridget Miles. The application relied on a lengthy sequence of negligence, trust, criminal complaint, judicial review and human-rights-related proceedings arising from disputes concerning a family trust and the sale of trust property.

The defendants maintained that their claims had reasonable grounds and that proceedings against different individuals or authorities could not amount to repetition. The court also considered whether the most recent proceedings, issued after an incorrectly worded letter from the Attorney General’s office, should count in assessing vexatious conduct.

1. Application granted. The court made an indefinite Civil Proceedings Order against both defendants under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981.
2. The court accepted the approach in Attorney General v Jones [1990] 1 WLR 859 that it could not go behind the findings made by judges in the earlier proceedings. It applied the characteristics of vexatious litigation identified by Lord Bingham LCJ in Attorney General v Barker [2000] 1 FLR 759, including proceedings with little or no discernible legal basis, misuse of court process and disproportionate expense.
3. The defendants had habitually and persistently instituted proceedings without reasonable grounds. The court rejected the submission that repetition required claims of the same kind against the same person. The proceedings formed a continuing attempt to reopen an underlying grievance through successive challenges to private individuals, public authorities and decisions connected with that grievance.
4. The seventh claim was not counted as vexatious because a letter from the Attorney General’s office could reasonably have been read as inviting judicial review of the decision to seek a section 42 order. The eighth claim, brought against the Crown Prosecution Service, was nevertheless vexatious and demonstrated the continuing risk of further litigation.
5. The order prohibited the defendants from instituting or continuing civil proceedings without the leave of a High Court judge. It did not prevent them from applying for permission. The court declined to attach a penal notice because there had been no known previous breach of a court order, but granted the Attorney General liberty to apply for one in the light of future events.

Not stated in the judgment.