Ewing, R (on the application of) v Davis

A private individual may generally institute criminal proceedings for an offence created by a public general Act. The prosecutor need not show a personal interest, locus standi, or an additional public interest in bringing the prosecution. The relevant public interest is established by the nature and purpose of the statutory offence, rather than by the circumstances of the alleged offence or the prosecutor’s relationship with it. Any restriction on the right of private prosecution must be imposed by Parliament. The statutory powers allowing the Director of Public Prosecutions or the Crown Prosecution Service to take over and discontinue proceedings do not qualify the underlying right.

The claimant, who had no personal interest in the alleged offences, laid informations against the defendant concerning public order and harassment allegations. The District Judge held that the informations were invalid because the claimant was a third-party prosecutor who had not shown that the proceedings concerned a public interest and benefit rather than a private grievance.

The claimant appealed by way of case stated. The central issue was whether a third party could institute criminal proceedings for offences under public general legislation without demonstrating a personal interest or an additional public interest in the prosecution.

1. Appeal allowed. The District Judge’s ruling was set aside and the case was remitted for the hearing to continue. The order for costs below was quashed.
2. The authorities established a general right for any member of the public to prosecute an offence created by a public general Act, unless the relevant statute expressly restricted or regulated who could prosecute. R v Hicks concerned a local Act enacted for the benefit of a market company and therefore did not qualify the general rule. The later authorities applied the same distinction between offences created for public protection and enactments protecting a limited private interest.
3. Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers provided a modern statement of the constitutional right of private prosecution. Section 6(1) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 neither extended nor qualified established rights.
4. The observations in R (Gladstone Plc) v Manchester City Magistrates’ Court did not decide whether any person could prosecute without showing a public interest. The court was therefore not bound by them. In any event, the modern formulation requiring a third-party prosecutor to establish public interest and benefit was not founded on the authorities.
5. The public interest is established by the nature of the offence created by the statute. Courts should not investigate the circumstances of the alleged offence or the prosecutor’s relationship with it as a condition of standing. If the right is to be restricted, Parliament must enact the restriction.
6. The statutory safeguards were sufficient to address unmeritorious proceedings. Under sections 6(2) and 23 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, the Director of Public Prosecutions or the Crown Prosecution Service could take over and discontinue a private prosecution. A criminal proceedings order could also be sought under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 if appropriate.
7. Subject to any separate abuse of process argument, the informations were properly laid and the summonses should proceed to a hearing. The defendant was ordered to pay the claimant’s assessed costs of £562.50.

• Hastings Magistrates’ Court: The District Judge held that the claimant, as a third-party prosecutor, had no locus standi and that the informations were invalid.
• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal by way of case stated was allowed. The case was remitted to the District Judge for the hearing to continue.