Conrad, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Whether a review of a life prisoner’s detention is sufficiently speedy under Article 5(4) depends on all the circumstances of the individual case. There is no fixed rule that an interval exceeding one year is unlawful, but a period approaching two years requires adequate, case-specific justification.

The Secretary of State must set no longer review period than is reasonable. Administrative resources, logistical difficulties and delayed treatment cannot, without more, justify an excessive interval. The need for further work before a later review does not remove the prisoner’s right to prompt consideration by the Parole Board.

The claimant, serving a life sentence for murder, challenged the Secretary of State’s decision to defer his next parole review until May 2008, two years after the relevant decision in September 2006. The challenge alleged incompatibility with Article 5(4) of the European Convention on Human Rights, which requires the lawfulness of detention to be decided speedily.

Permission had been refused on the papers but granted on renewal on the Article 5(4) issue. The separate challenge to refusal of transfer to open conditions was no longer before the court. The central question was whether the particular two-year interval was objectively compatible with the requirement of a speedy review.

1. The application succeeded on the Article 5(4) issue. The court declared that, in September 2006, fixing the next review for May 2008 did not satisfy the requirement that the lawfulness of detention be decided speedily.
2. The applicable assessment is fact-sensitive. The court adopted the approach explained in R(Day) v the Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWHC 1742 Admin: the question is whether the decision provides for a speedy review, having regard to all the circumstances and giving due weight to the Secretary of State’s assessment. There is no presumption that an interval exceeding one year is unlawful.
3. The Secretary of State had not adequately explained why two years was appropriate. Although assessments and courses would necessarily take time, the necessary assessments had not been undertaken, and it was not yet known what further work would be required or whether it could be undertaken only in closed conditions.
4. Delay caused by resources, lack of space, competing priorities or other logistical difficulties is not, without more, an answer to an alleged breach of Article 5(4). The court applied the guidance in Murray v Parole Board [2003] EWCA Civ 1616 and Noorkoiv v the Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ 770.
5. The possibility that release or transfer might later prove premature did not justify denying prompt consideration by the Parole Board. The court granted declaratory relief only and directed that the identified assessments take place by 30 September 2007. It refused permission to amend to claim damages and awarded the claimant two-thirds of his costs.

This was a first-instance judicial review. Permission was initially refused on the papers by Crane J, but limited permission was granted on renewal by Langstaff J on the Article 5(4) issue. The Administrative Court then granted declaratory relief.