Crown Prosecution Service v Sedgemoor Justices

An interlocutory challenge to a ruling in Magistrates’ Court proceedings should generally await the conclusion of the trial and proceed by case stated. An exception may arise where the ruling is effectively terminating and the legal issue can be resolved without further factual findings, since insisting on a formal acquittal would cause pointless expense and delay.

Section 16 of the Road Traffic Offences Act 1988 is permissive. It provides a simplified certificate route where the analyst is authorised; it does not make analysis evidence admissible only if given by an authorised analyst. Evidence from an unauthorised analyst may be admitted through ordinary expert evidence, provided the court is satisfied that the witness is expert and that the analysis is reliable.

The Crown Prosecution Service applied for judicial review of a ruling by Sedgemoor Justices in proceedings for driving with excess alcohol contrary to section 5(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1988. The justices ruled that evidence of blood analysis was inadmissible because the proposed forensic toxicologist was not an authorised analyst under section 16(7) of the Road Traffic Offences Act 1988.

The application was brought before the Magistrates’ Court proceedings had concluded. The central issues were whether the court should intervene at that stage and whether section 16 confined proof of blood analysis to evidence from an authorised analyst.

1. Interlocutory challenge. The normal rule, stated in R v Rochford Justices ex p Buck (1978) 68 Cr App R 114, is that the High Court should not interrupt unfinished Magistrates’ Court proceedings. The prosecution should ordinarily continue to the end of the trial and challenge an adverse final outcome by case stated. That approach is reinforced by Loade v Director of Public Prosecutions [1990] 1 QB 1052 and Hoar-Stevens v Richmond Magistrates’ Court [2003] EWHC 2660 (Admin).
2. The court nevertheless had jurisdiction to hear this application. The ruling was effectively terminating because, without the analysis evidence, an acquittal was inevitable. The legal issue could be resolved without further factual findings, and requiring the prosecution to obtain an acquittal before appealing would create further expense and delay. The decision did not encourage interlocutory challenges; misconceived applications at that stage would ordinarily be refused permission. R (Watson) v Dartford Magistrates’ Court [2005] EWHC 905 (Admin) was materially distinguishable because an interlocutory challenge concerning an adjournment might otherwise have become too late after conviction.
3. Construction of section 16. Section 16(1) is permissive. It provides one method of proving analysis, namely production of a certificate signed by an authorised analyst, subject to the accused’s right to require the analyst’s attendance. It does not stipulate the exclusive means by which analysis evidence may be given.
4. The statutory contrast with section 15 supports that construction. Section 15 contains restrictive admissibility provisions, whereas section 16 sets out a certificate procedure. Service under section 16 is required by subsection (3); subsection (6) prescribes the method of service. Neither provision excludes other forms of admissible proof.
5. The reasoning in Thom v Director of Public Prosecutions (High Court, 20 January 1993, CO/302/92) concerning section 16(1)(a) applies equally to section 16(1)(b). Analysis evidence may therefore be given by a skilled witness, including an unauthorised analyst, through a witness statement or oral evidence, subject to the ordinary requirements of expertise and reliability.
6. The toxicologist’s evidence was not inadmissible solely because she was not authorised under section 16(7). The justices’ decision was wrong in law. The matter was declared accordingly and remitted to the justices to continue the hearing in the light of the judgment.

The application was a judicial review challenge to an interlocutory ruling by Sedgemoor Justices. The High Court entertained the challenge as an exceptional case, declared the ruling wrong in law, and remitted the proceedings to the justices.