Thompson & Ors v Arnold

Where an injured person settles or obtains judgment for damages during life, dependants cannot subsequently bring a claim under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 arising from the same injury. The rule in Read v Great Eastern Railway remains correct. It prevents the wrongdoer from being required to pay twice and reflects the statutory requirement that the injured person could have maintained an action immediately before death.

This construction does not infringe Convention rights. Nor can equity generally relieve a party from a settlement because the opposing party knew of a unilateral mistake, absent conduct which induced the mistake or made reliance on the settlement unconscionable.

The claimants, the widower and daughters of Wendy Thompson, brought proceedings against her former general practitioner under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976. Mrs Thompson had previously sued the defendant during her lifetime for negligent failure to diagnose breast cancer. That claim was settled by consent for £120,000 in full and final satisfaction before her death.

The defendant contended that the settlement prevented any subsequent fatal accident claim. The claimants argued that the established construction of the Act should be reconsidered under section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, that section 12 of the Limitation Act 1980 did not apply, and that the defendant should be denied reliance on the settlement because the claimants’ legal advisers had made a mistake which the defendant knew about.

1. The preliminary issue was determined against the claimants and the claim was dismissed with costs.

2. The court was bound by, and agreed with, the rule in Read v Great Eastern Railway. The Fatal Accidents Act 1976 is consolidating legislation. Its wording preserves the earlier law unless a change is unavoidable. Section 1(1), including the words referring to death notwithstanding the injured person’s death, requires consideration of whether the injured person could maintain an action and recover damages at the relevant time.

3. The statutory purpose is to ensure that a wrongdoer does not escape liability merely because the injury causes death, not to confer a second recovery after the wrongdoer has already satisfied the injured person’s claim. Allowing a later dependency claim after settlement would recreate the double-recovery problem addressed by the Administration of Justice Act 1982.

4. Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 did not require a different interpretation. The dependants’ Fatal Accidents Act right is statutory and arises only within the limits defined by the Act. The settlement therefore did not arbitrarily remove an existing general right under Articles 6 or 8 of the Convention.

5. Section 12 of the Limitation Act 1980 provided an additional answer. Once Mrs Thompson had settled her claim, she could no longer maintain an action and recover damages for the injury. The words “or for any other reason” were sufficiently wide to include that consequence.

6. The settlement covered the whole lifetime damages claim. The reference to full and final satisfaction could not be reopened by analysing whether particular heads of loss had been separately identified. Any attempt to reopen the settlement would also encounter cause of action estoppel.

7. The equitable claims based on unilateral mistake, rectification, rescission and estoppel failed. The defendant’s conduct had not induced the mistake, made a false representation, or created a trap. There was no general duty on one party to litigation to point out the other party’s legal mistakes. In any event, the claimants’ own representatives had sought to benefit from perceived mistakes by the defendant.