Crown Prosecution Service v City of London Magistrates' Court

Interest accruing on an unpaid confiscation order forms part of the amount to be recovered. When activating a default sentence, magistrates must calculate the same proportion of the fixed default term as the total debt, including accrued interest, bears to the confiscation order.

Judicial review must be brought promptly. Compliance with the three-month outer limit does not necessarily establish promptness. Where a public authority has delayed without adequate explanation, and granting relief would cause substantial hardship or prejudice, the court may withhold substantive relief even though the underlying legal error is established. A declaration may be granted without quashing or remitting the decision.

The Crown Prosecution Service challenged the City of London Magistrates' Court's activation of 85 days of a three-year default sentence imposed for non-payment of a confiscation order. The magistrates calculated the period by reference to the unpaid capital only and omitted accrued statutory interest.

The CPS sought judicial review, an order quashing the sentence and remission with a direction that 536 days be imposed. The interested party relied on delay, prejudice and the hardship of renewed imprisonment. The central issues were whether interest had to be included in calculating the default period and whether relief should nevertheless be refused because the claim had not been brought promptly.

1. Construction of the confiscation regime. Section 15(1) of the Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990 provides that interest on an unpaid confiscation sum is treated, for enforcement purposes, as part of the amount recoverable under the order. The Crown Court's default term fixes the maximum period. Within that limit, the magistrates must calculate the proportion by reference to the outstanding principal and accrued interest together. The correct calculation would have produced 536 days.
2. Promptness and judicial review. CPR 54.5 requires a claim to be filed promptly and, in any event, within three months. The three-month period is not a universal measure of promptness. The court may consider whether delay makes it unfair or wrong for the claim to proceed or succeed. The approach in R v Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall, ex parte Hay [1996] All ER 711 was treated as a rule of thumb rather than a proposition of law. The more authoritative guidance in Hardy v Pembrokeshire County Council [2006] EWCA Civ 240 was applicable.
3. Discretionary relief. The CPS had delayed in correcting the error, despite available applications to the magistrates and, if necessary, the High Court. The public interest in enforcing confiscation orders was accepted, but it did not outweigh the unfairness of releasing the interested party and then requiring him to return to prison for a further substantial term as a consequence of official delay. Judicial review was a remedy of last resort, and the CPS had used it only after other possible remedies had been foregone.
4. The court therefore granted a declaration that interest must be included in calculating the default sentence. It refused the orders quashing the 85-day sentence and remitting the matter with a direction to impose 536 days.

The City of London Magistrates' Court activated 85 days of the default sentence on 21 September 2006. The High Court (Administrative Court) granted declaratory relief but refused to quash or remit the magistrates' decision.