TJ v CV & Anor

In a family formed through assisted conception, the biological progenitor’s status and contact must be determined by the child’s welfare, not by an assumed entitlement to parental status. The court must consider both the psychological and biological dimensions of family life. Parental responsibility may be refused where, despite commitment and acceptable motivation, its exercise would threaten the autonomy of the child’s nuclear family and create damaging conflict. Contact may properly recognise the child’s biological connection while remaining infrequent and carefully limited so that it does not acquire a parental character. Under the Children Act 1989, making no order on parental responsibility may be preferable to either a restricted grant or an adjournment.

The applicant was the biological father of a child born into a family comprising the child’s mother and her civil partner. The adults had initially contemplated a limited role for the applicant, but their relationship deteriorated during the pregnancy. The applicant sought parental responsibility and regular contact. The mother and her partner opposed parental responsibility and proposed only very limited contact. The guardian supported resolving the issue rather than leaving it uncertain. The central questions were whether parental responsibility would promote the child’s welfare and what form of contact would preserve the child’s knowledge of his biological origins without undermining the established nuclear family.

1. Parental responsibility. Applications remained subject to the overriding welfare requirement in section 1(1) of the Children Act 1989. Commitment, attachment and motivation were relevant, but they were not decisive. Although the applicant was genuine, committed and acceptably motivated, parental responsibility would be inconsistent with the agreed structure of the family and would be perceived as a threat to the autonomy of the mother and her partner. The resulting conflict would be contrary to the child’s best interests.
2. Under section 1(5), the court could make no order on the application. A restricted grant would raise false hopes and fuel conflict, while an adjournment would leave the family under continuing uncertainty. Making no order was treated as a final order, subject to a radical change of circumstances. The court distinguished the approach in B v A, C&D [2006] EWHC 0002 (Fam), where parental responsibility had been granted subject to conditions and undertakings.
3. Contact. Contact had to serve the child’s interests rather than confer parental status or permit development of a parental relationship. It should allow the child, in time and if desired, to explore his biological origins and maintain a significant but non-parental relationship. Four contacts a year were ordered: three individual meetings and one family gathering, generally for about two hours, on neutral territory. A known adult might attend initially, and gifts were to remain modest.
4. Restriction on further applications. Applying the guidance in Re P (Section 91(14) Guidelines) (Residence & Religious Heritage) [1996] 1 FLR 356 (CA), the court made a five-year order under section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989. No application for an order under, or variation of an order under, sections 4 or 8 could be made without leave.

First-instance decision. No prior appellate decision was stated in the judgment.