Secretary of State for the Home Department v AL

In reviewing a control order, the court must decide whether the Secretary of State had reasonable grounds for suspecting terrorism-related activity and whether the order and each restriction were necessary. The assessment may rely on open and closed evidence taken together. A controlled person’s detention on remand does not by itself make an order unnecessary, although custody may be decisive where imprisonment is known to cover most of the order’s likely duration. Restrictions preventing foreign travel and limiting contacts may be necessary and proportionate where the evidence establishes a risk of terrorist travel or influence over others. The court applied the approach to procedural fairness under SSHD v MB and [2006] EWCA Civ 1140, as applied in SSHD v AF and [2007] EWHC 651 (Admin).

The Secretary of State made a control order against AL under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. The order restricted his residence, movements, travel, contacts and access to travel documents. The Secretary of State alleged that AL had encouraged and supported the radicalisation and planned departure of AK, and that AL himself intended to travel abroad for terrorist-related purposes.

AL challenged the existence of reasonable grounds, the necessity and proportionality of the restrictions, and the fairness of the procedure under article 6. He also argued that the order was unnecessary because he was on remand in custody and because ordinary surveillance would suffice. The central issues were whether the statutory grounds and necessity requirements were met and whether the order should remain in force.

1. Control order upheld. The court held that the Secretary of State had reasonable grounds, based on the open and closed evidence viewed together, for suspecting that AL had supported AK’s radicalisation and that AL himself intended to travel abroad for terrorist-related purposes. The allegations were probably correct.
2. The court accepted the revised assessment that AL had encouraged, supported and advised AK, exercised significant control over him and distanced him from his family. AL’s denials were not accepted. The evidence also supported the inference that the two men shared an intention to travel to Pakistan for terrorist-related purposes.
3. The order and its restrictions were necessary. The restrictions preventing travel outside Great Britain, requiring surrender of travel documents and controlling contacts were justified by the risk of foreign travel and by the risk that AL might develop similar relationships with others. The suggestion that ordinary surveillance would suffice lacked evidential support.
4. AL’s detention on remand did not, without more, make the order unnecessary. Custody could be decisive where the probable period of imprisonment was known to cover all, or most, of the order’s duration. Here, the prospect of an early bail application and a later trial did not justify quashing or revoking the order.
5. The order was not disproportionate. Its effect on AL, including any stigma, did not outweigh the need to prevent terrorist-related travel and influence. Applying SSHD v MB [2006] EWCA Civ 1140 and the approach stated in SSHD v AF [2007] EWHC 651 (Admin), there was no breach of article 6 on the law then applicable.
6. The order was upheld as it stood. The Secretary of State was to reconsider the position in light of the pending House of Lords decision on related issues.